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Dodging the Taxman: Why the Treasury’s
Anti-Abuse Regulation is Unconstitutional
LINDA D. JELLUM+*
To combat abusive tax shelters, the Department of the Tresury promulgated a general anti-abuse regulation applicable to all of subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. The Treasury targeted subchapter K because unique
aspects of the partnership tax laws—including its aggregateentity dichotomy—foster creative tax manipulation. In the
anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury attempted to “codify”
existing judicially- created anti-abuse doctrines, such as the
business-purpose and economic-substance doctrines. Also,
and more surprisingly, the Treasury directed those applying
subchapter K to use a purposivist approach to interpretation
and to reject textualism.
In this article, I demonstrate that the Treasury exceeded both
its constitutional and statutory authority. Congress neither
expressly nor implicitly delegated to the Treasury the power
either to direct a method of statutory interpretation or to
codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines. Hence,
the regulation is unconstitutional. Alternatively, even if Congress validly delegated either power to the Treasury, the
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anti-abuse regulation exceeded the scope of any delegated
power and is, thus, ultra vires.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that tomorrow the Treasury promulgated a new regulation that directs all taxpayers to ignore the words in the Tax Code
and instead pay the amount of taxes that Congress expects them to
pay. Further, imagine that the regulation empowers the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (“Commissioner” and “Service”) to reject tax returns that comply with the literal language in
the Code, but violate its spirit. Finally, imagine that Congress never
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delegated the authority to the Treasury to promulgate such a regulation. Would this be a legitimate executive response to perceived tax
abuse or an unconstitutional power grab?
There is no need to imagine. In 1994, the Treasury promulgated
a regulation almost identical to the hypothetical one in response to
the abusive tax shelters of the 1990s. Treasury Regulation 1.701-2,
the anti-abuse regulation, applies to subchapter K, the partnership
chapter of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Greatly simplified,
the anti-abuse regulation permits the Commissioner to recast any
partnership transaction that is inconsistent with “the intent of subchapter K. . . .”1 The regulation defines the intent of subchapter K
by referencing judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines unique to
tax law, including the business-purpose doctrine and the substanceover-form principles.2
The anti-abuse regulation does two unusual things. First, it imposes an overarching standard on top of subchapter K’s rules, and
in doing so, it fundamentally changed existing law. Second, and
more surprisingly, the anti-abuse regulation directs those interpreting subchapter K to use purposivism and to reject textualism. This
directive squarely raises the questions of how tax statutes ought to
be interpreted and of who ought to choose the interpretive method.
At bottom, the regulation pits textualism against purposivism, rules
against standards, and the judiciary against the executive.
In 2010, Congress codified the economic-substance doctrine.3
Oddly, Congress did not clearly identify when its new statute applies; rather, courts have complete discretion regarding the statute’s
application.4 Because the statute provides no guidance, the Treasury
and the courts may well turn to the anti-abuse regulation to fill the

1

Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995).
Id. §1.701-2(a).
3
I.R.C. § 7701 (West 2014).
4
Pursuant to § 7701(o)(1), the economic substance doctrine applies whenever it is “relevant.” Id. § 7701(o)(1). Relevancy is not defined; however, the statute states that the decision of “whether the economic[-]substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if [the codified economic-substance doctrine] had never been enacted.” Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
2
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gaps when applicability of the economic-substance statute is uncertain. Indeed, in Nevada Partners Fund, L.L.C. v. United States, the
Service did just that.5
However, the anti-abuse regulation should not fill those gaps because it is unconstitutional or, alternatively, ultra vires. In this Article, I explain that because Congress never delegated authority to the
Treasury to issue the anti-abuse regulation, the regulation is unconstitutional. Moreover, even if Congress implicitly delegated such authority, the Treasury’s regulation exceeded the bounds of that delegation, making the regulation ultra vires. In exploring these concerns, I examine a question never before addressed in either the academic literature or jurisprudence: when agencies discern the legislative intent or statutory purpose for a group of related statutes, in
this case seventy-two separate statutes making up subchapter K, is
their determination entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.?6 In my opinion, the answer to that question is no; agencies are entitled to Chevron deference when they interpret ambiguous statutory language in a statute,
not when they discern the statutory purpose or legislative intent for
a group of statutes.
In Part I of this Article, I introduce the problem that led to the
regulation: abusive tax shelters of the 1990s. Because the tax shelters of the ‘90s differed from those of the ‘70s and ‘80s, a new approach was needed.7 To combat this new form of tax shelter, the
Treasury chose a standards-based approach.8 In Part II, I explain
why the agency selected a standards-based approach and why the
agency targeted subchapter K. While abusive tax shelters were not
unique to partnerships, subchapter K was a logical chapter for the
Treasury to target because tax avoidance is one reason taxpayers
choose this particular business entity.9 Moreover, unique aspects of
the partnership tax laws—including its aggregate-entity dichotomy—allow for innovative tax manipulation.10
5

Nev. Partners Fund, L.L.C. ex rel. Sapphire II, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
IRS, 720 F.3d 594, 606 (5th Cir. 2013).
6
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
7
See infra note 41.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 66–74.
9
See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 890 F.2d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 1989),
rev’d, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
10
See infra notes 59 & 64.
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Next, in Part III, I describe the proposed regulation, the outrage
it caused, the changes that were made, and the final regulation. The
final regulation permits the Commissioner to recast a partnership
transaction used in a manner inconsistent with “the intent of subchapter K.”11 The final regulation included two provisions that raise
constitutional questions: (1) one directs interpreters of subchapter K
to use purposivism, and (2) the other defines the “intent of subchapter K” by adopting and significantly modifying the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.12
While the controversy and hullabaloo over the regulation’s
promulgation were fierce, the regulation’s validity has been virtually ignored since its promulgation. Thus, in Part IV, I demonstrate
that the Treasury exceeded both its constitutional and statutory authority. Congress neither expressly nor implicitly delegated to the
Treasury the power either to direct a method of statutory interpretation or to codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.
Hence, the regulation is unconstitutional. Alternatively, even if Congress validly delegated either power to the Treasury, the anti-abuse
regulation exceeded the scope of any delegated power and is, thus,
ultra vires.
Finally, I conclude by conceding that abusive tax shelters are a
problem and will continue to be a problem for a long time to come.
While the Treasury’s goal in trying to stop the abuse is laudable, its
response is a bold and unconstitutional power grab.
I.
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS
Tax avoidance is as “American” as apple pie and baseball. Indeed, tax protesting predated the imposition of income tax in this
Country; after all, the Boston Tea Party was an organized revolt
against the imposition of a tax on tea. More recently, instead of
dumping dried green leaves into a harbor, marijuana enthusiasts distributed 600 free joints as an organized revolt against Colorado’s
attempt to impose a tax on that drug.13
11

Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b)(1) (1995).
Id. § 1.701-2(b), (e)(1).
13
Michael Winter, Tax Opponents Hand Out Free Pot in Denver, USA
TODAY (Sept. 9, 2013, 10:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/09/denver-free-marijuana-tax-protest/2790133/.
12
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Since the federal government began collecting taxes, taxpayers
have sought ways to minimize or avoid paying them, including employees from the Service.14 Taxpayers are reasonable people and, if
given a choice, will choose transactions that minimize their tax obligations and maximize their income; their choice becomes improper
when the transaction is one that is chosen only to avoid taxes.15
Tax planning and minimization are inevitable, unavoidable,16
and even acceptable.17 “[P]lanning to reduce taxes is not only
proper, it is the sine qua non of a sound business plan.”18 To reduce
taxes, taxpayers turn to the language of the tax laws. The tax code is
a “complex and detailed set of statutes subject to traditional interpretive analysis.”19 How much tax reduction and avoidance is legitimate? Tax experts fundamentally disagree, and their disagreement
14

Josh Hicks, IRS Paid Bonuses to Tax-delinquent Employees, Report Says,
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federaleye/wp/2014/04/23/irs-paid-bonuses-to-tax-delinquent-employees-reportsays/?tid=hpModule_308f7142-9199-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239.
15
Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1949–50 (2005).
16
Scott A. Schumacher, MacNiven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using
“Purposive Textualism” to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax
Advice, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 101, 107 (2008) (“[T]ax planning and minimization
are both inevitable and unavoidable.”).
17
See Comm’r v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S.
465 (1935) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”); United States v. Isham,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496, 506 (1873) (stating that when tax avoidance “is carried
out by the means of legal forms, it is subject to no legal censure”); Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365 (1960) (“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease
the amount of . . . his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted . . . .”) (quoting Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469); see also
Edwin S. Cohen, Tax Avoidance Purpose as a Statutory Text in Tax Legislation,
9 PROC. ANN. TUL. TAX INST. 229, 230 (1960).
18
Herman J. Marino, The Final Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation: The
Treasury Redefines the “Intent of Subchapter K”, 73 TAXES 171, 172 (1995).
19
Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 589 (2014) [hereinafter Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse
Doctrines]; see Elizabeth Garrett, Viewpoint: Remarks on Anti-Abuse Rules, 74
TAXES 197, 199 (1996); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 358 (2006). Tax exceptionalism—the notion that
tax statutes should be interpreted differently from other statutes—has largely been
rejected. See Kristin E. Hickman, Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, 12 ENGAGE: J.
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stems, in part, from a controversy regarding the best way to interpret
the tax code.20
Textualists wish to hold Congress and the Treasury strictly to
the words in the Code.21 They argue that if a transaction complies
literally with the law, then that transaction should be upheld, even if
it is inconsistent with the law’s spirit or intent.22 They see no reason
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 4, 4–5 (2011) [hereinafter Goodbye]; see generally Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006).
20
Like the controversy surrounding statutory interpretation more generally,
the controversy surrounding tax law interpretation has exploded in the last twenty
years. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in
the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 322–23 (2012); Steve R. Johnson,
Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2013);
Steve R. Johnson, Deference to Tax Agencies’ Interpretations of Their Regulations, 60 ST. TAX NOTES 665, 665 (2011); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed Purposive Approach, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 697, 699 (2009); Steve R. Johnson, The Two Kinds of Legislative
Intent, 51 ST. TAX NOTES 1045, 1045 (2009); Steve R. Johnson, Use and Abuse
of the ‘Plain Meaning’, 49 ST. TAX NOTES 831, 831 (2008); Allen D. Madison,
The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form Doctrines in Tax
Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 716–18 (2003); Andre L. Smith, The Deliberative Stylings of Leading Tax Law Scholars, 61 TAX LAW. 1, 2 (2007); Andre
L. Smith, Formulaically Describing 21st Century Supreme Court Tax Jurisprudence, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 37, 41–42 (2007); David F. Shores, Textualism
and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61 TAX LAW. 53, 53 (2007); David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration, and Legislative Intent, 53 TAX LAW. 579,
580–81 (2000); Goodbye, supra note 19, at 4; Deborah A. Geier, Commentary:
Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445, 450 (1993); Lawrence Zelenak,
Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 623 (1986); Ernest J. Brown, The Growing “Common Law” of Taxation,
34 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (1961) (describing the harm that can arise from
undeviating literalness). For a general discussion of the merits of tax literalism
and tax nonliteralism, see generally Zelenak, supra note 20 (urging the Supreme
Court to provide better guidance on resolving nonliteral tax issues).
21
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 19, at 199 (“[T]he language of the statute is
the law, and if it is clear, in most cases it should be applied by the Service and by
the courts.”). For an example of a textualist majority opinion and a purposivist
dissenting opinion, see Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206, 213, 222 (2001) (majority concluded that the text of the statute was clear, while the dissent reasoned that
policy considerations should be taken into account).
22
Peter L. Faber, Faber Offers Views on Partnership Antiabuse Reg., 94 TNT
167-9, Aug. 25, 1994, LEXIS; Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule:
Dirty Minds Meet Mrs. Gregory, 64 TAX NOTES 295 (1994) (describing a public
hearing regarding the proposed regulations).
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for courts to apply the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines23 that
allow the Service to reconfigure business transactions based on their
economic impact, as opposed to their literal form.24
In contrast, non-textualists argue that textualism, particularly in
its literalist form, fosters sham transactions that undermine the legitimacy of the Code.25 The detailed and highly complex nature of the
tax laws create loopholes, allowing taxpayers to pay less in taxes or,
in some cases, avoid paying income taxes altogether.26 Thus, nontextualists believe that textualism encouraged the proliferation of tax
shelters by offering them legitimacy.27
Non-textualists further lament that this approach to tax compliance involves little peril for taxpayers because the most they risk is
paying taxes that they would have had to pay anyway.28 While the
Treasury can assess penalties, the reasonable/good-faith exception
hinders this option’s effectiveness.29 More commonly, taxpayers

23
See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 589–604 (detailing these doctrines).
24
See Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters,
24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 25–26 (2004) (“The courts would not have developed the
economic substance doctrine if they had been using the textualist method of statutory interpretation.”).
25
Id. at 20; see Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1641, 1644–45 (2012) (noting that one problem for the government is that the sham activities are entirely consistent with the letter of the law);
Schumacher, supra note 16, at 101 (claiming that hyper-textualism “led too many
advisors and their clients to review a position on a ‘can I get away with this’ analysis”); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 633; McCormack, supra note 20, at 699 (arguing
that “courts should ask whether the results of the transactions (meaning the tax
savings claimed) are within the purposes of the Code”); Brown, supra note 20,
236–37 (describing the harm that results from literalness).
26
John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax
Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1523 (1997).
27
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 2, 20 (“The ascendancy of textualism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the promotion and sale of ‘abusive’ tax shelters.”).
28
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1940.
29
The reasonable/good-faith exception allows taxpayers to claim that they
relied on legal opinions from tax lawyers to avoid paying penalties. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2010) (“No penalty shall be imposed . . . with respect
to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was a reasonable cause
for such portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such
portion.”). If audited, a taxpayer can “honestly assert that he sought the opinion
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who are caught pay less than they would have paid had they not
“cheated.”30
Tax shelters involve transactions that allow a taxpayer to avoid
paying taxes that are otherwise due.31 Just as tax avoidance is not
per se unacceptable, tax shelters are not per se illegitimate.32 Congress regularly allows taxpayers to avoid paying taxes to encourage
specific behaviors. Likely, you have benefited from one of these arrangements. For example, legitimate ways to shelter income include
retirement plans, Roth IRA accounts, deductions for home mortgage
interest, the Hope scholarship credit, and deductions for small business research and development.33 Congress creates these tax programs to encourage specific social and economic behavior: the government wants people to save money for retirement, buy homes, go
to college, and invest in the research needed to develop new companies.34 These tax laws allow taxpayers to protect, or shelter, income
from immediate federal taxation; hence, they are called tax shelters.
Yet, they are not abusive. Abusive tax behavior involves more than

of reputable counsel and was assured thereby that the tax shelter scheme was consistent with the requirements of the law.” Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15,
at 1941; see also LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX
CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 472–79 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing
the reasonable cause exception for avoiding tax penalties); Schumacher, supra
note 16, at 123–29 (describing opinion letters and relevant regulations).
30
For example, in March 2013, Ernst & Young LLP agreed to pay the United
States $123 million to resolve a criminal fraud investigation into that firm’s alleged use of tax shelters to evade at least $2 billion in taxes. See Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement with Ernst &
Young LLP to Pay $123 Million to Resolve Federal Tax Shelter Fraud Investigation (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorneyannounces-agreement-ernst-young-llp-pay-123-million-resolve.
31
Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 584.
32
Id.
33
See Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV.
389, 395–96 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Economic Substance].
34
See generally id. at 394–95 (explaining that tax law seeks in some situations to measure taxpayer income and in others to alter taxpayer behavior); see
also Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J.
1717, 1725 (2014) [hereinafter Hickman, Administering the Tax System] (noting
that many features in the code further social welfare and regulatory goals in addition to seeking revenue).
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simply accepting government incentives to protect income; it involves exploiting the tax laws.35 Examples of abusive tax transactions include those that shift or strip income or basis, including foreign companies,36 those that creatively arrange financing, and those
that involve sale-lease back arrangements.37
So, exactly when is a tax shelter illegal? The line between legal
and illegal tax shelters is blurred, so blurred that the Service characterizes improper shelters as “abusive” rather than “illegal.”38 Because they can take so many different forms, there is no single definition or prototype of an abusive tax shelter. Consequently, rather
than provide one global definition, the Code contains multiple definitions.39 However, a common theme runs through these definitions:
35

Tax avoidance differs from tax evasion. Tax avoiders use the tax laws to
reduce the amount of taxes due by lawful means, while tax evaders deliberately
misrepresent the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities to reduce their tax
liability. See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and
the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 994 (2004);
Boris I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal
Revenue Code, 21 HOW. L.J. 693, 696 (1978) (“[I]t is more common to contrast
‘tax avoidance’ with ‘tax evasion,’ the former phrase denoting lawful modes of
minimizing or avoiding tax liability, while the latter implies fraudulent behavior.”).
36
Because tax rates differ in different countries, companies can set up subsidiaries to absorb tax gains in countries that have no corporate tax, such as the
British Virgin Islands. While companies generally pay a registration fee, they pay
little to no corporate taxes. See PKF INT’L LTD., BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS TAX
GUIDE 2013 1 (2013), http://www.pkf.com/media/1954323/british%20virgin%20islands%20pkf%20tax%20guide%202013.pdf.
37
Interview Carl Levin, TAX ME IF YOU CAN, PBS (Feb. 19, 2004),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/interviews/levin.html.
38
In 1999, the Treasury identified some common characteristics of illegitimate tax shelters: (1) Lack of economic substance or business purpose; (2) Inconsistent financial accounting and tax treatments; (3) Participation by tax-exempt
entities or entities that receive a substantial fee to enter into the transaction; (4)
Marketing activity; (5) Confidentiality; (6) Tax-saving fee structures; and (7)
High transactions costs. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS v–vi (July 1999), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/report3095.aspx.
39
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West 2015) (“[T]he term ‘tax shelter’
means—(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan or arrangement,
or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership,
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”);
see also id. § 448(d)(3); id. § 6111(c).
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abusive tax shelters are business arrangements where “a significant
purpose of such . . . arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”40
Regardless of how they are defined, abusive tax shelters were
not new in the ‘90s, but their character changed in two fundamental
ways from the tax shelters of the ‘70s and ‘80s: (1) the ‘90s tax shelters exploited more tax laws and involved more sophisticated entities, and (2) tax advising became a profit-seeking activity.41
The case of ACM Partnership v. Commissioner42 illustrates both
the characteristics of the abusive tax shelters of the ‘90s and the new
role that tax professionals had assumed. The case involved two wellknown corporations: Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Colgate) and its tax
advisor, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill Lynch).43 The two
formed an offshore partnership with a foreign corporation in which
the foreign corporation held approximately an eighty-three percent
interest, Colgate held approximately a seventeen percent interest,
and Merrill Lynch held a nominal interest of less than one percent.44
The partnership acquired $205 million worth of securities, which it
then sold to a third party for $140 million cash and a $35 million

40

I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii).
The abusive tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s typically involved uppermiddle income taxpayers who deducted non-economic losses from wages and investment income. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951; Del Wright Jr.,
Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil the IRS (and How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 626–27
(2013). For example, a profitable lawyer or doctor might become a partner in a
farming business to offset legal or medical income. Because these tax shelters
exploited specific loopholes in the Code, Congress used a rule-based approach to
close these loopholes. Section 469 of the 1986 Tax Reform Act limited a taxpayer’s ability to deduct losses from businesses in which that taxpayer did not
materially participate. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951; see I.R.C.
§§ 501(b), 469(a)(1) (West 2014) (called “passive loss rules”). The abusive tax
shelters of the 1990s differed in significant ways from these abusive tax shelters;
the new tax shelters exploited more tax laws and involved more sophisticated entities. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951–52; McCormack, supra
note 20, at 707–08.
42
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 1997 WL 93314 (1997),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1017 (1999).
43
Id. at *5.
44
Id. at *12.
41
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multi-year installment note.45 The partnership realized a huge capital gain from this purchase and sale, but because the foreign corporation owned eighty-three percent of the partnership interest, most
of that gain was not subject to tax in the United States.46 After the
sale, the partnership redeemed the foreign corporation’s interest so
that Colgate then held ninety-nine percent of the partnership interest.47 After acquiring the foreign corporation’s interest, Colgate sold
the installment note, which resulted in a $110 million deductible
loss, which Colgate used to reduce capital gains it had earned on the
sale of a subsidiary in that same year.48 The Service disallowed the
loss, claiming that Colgate’s sole purpose for the transaction was to
reduce its taxes; therefore, the transaction lacked economic substance.49 Colgate filed suit. Although the transaction complied literally with the language of the tax law, the Tax Court disregarded the
transaction because it failed the economic-substance test.50
As abusive tax shelters like these proliferated, the Treasury
struggled to respond.51 Previously, the Treasury and the courts had
used the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines to combat tax
abuse.52 However, as tax shelters proliferated and changed, these
doctrines proved ineffective, and repeated amendments to the tax
laws proved fruitless.53 The Code had increased in length, detail, and

45

Id. at *15.
Id. at *19–20.
47
Id. at *23–24.
48
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1943.
49
ACM P’Ship, 1997 WL 93314, at *35.
50
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1945. In this case, the economicsubstance doctrine served as an extra-statutory requirement, meaning that in addition to complying with the statute, the taxpayer had to comply with the economic-substance doctrine. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Amandeep S.
Grewal in Support of Neither Party at 14–20, United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct.
557 (2013) (No. 12-562) (explaining “the differences between the extrastatutory
and interstitial approaches to economic substance issues”).
51
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1946.
52
Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
5, 5 (2000) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.701).
53
See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1962 (“[E]conomic substance
doctrine is simply too weak a barrier to protect the collection of income tax from
assault by abusive shelter planners.”); McCormack, supra note 20, at 704.
46
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complexity, as Congress attempted to address each creative new tax
avoidance scheme.54
Requiring the Service to respond using existing law forced it to
play catch up to address each latest tax shenanigan.55 The Service
would identify an abusive transaction, request a legislative response,
wait for legislation or draft new regulations, and then apply the new
rules prospectively.56 During this sometimes lengthy process, taxpayers continued to use the abusive transactions. Because the government was “unable to keep pace with the imagination of tax professionals and the sheer volume of taxpayer maneuvers [designed]
to avoid the application of increasingly complex tax laws[,]”57
something stronger was needed.58 The Treasury set its sights on subchapter K.
II.

FORMULATING A REMEDY

A. Targeting Subchapter K
Because the Government simply could not craft enough targeted
rules to stem the abuse, the Treasury decided to develop a general
anti-abuse standard for subchapter K.59 “An obvious question that
54

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on the Proposed Partnership
Antiabuse Rule, 64 TAX NOTES 233, 233–35 (1994) (noting that the partnership
tax law grew incredibly complex as the government attempted to address abusive
transactions).
55
See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1951.
56
See Joseph Bankman, The Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Appropriate Response to Serious Problem, 64 TAX NOTES 270, 270 (1994) [hereinafter
Bankman, Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule].
57
William H. Caudill, Ninth Circuit Invalidates Anti-Abuse Rule; Is Reg.
1.701-2 Similarly Flawed?, 83 J. TAX’N 380, 380 (1995) [hereinafter Caudill,
Ninth Circuit].
58
The Treasury believed that regulating was needed to stop the “abusive” tax
schemes. See Marino, supra note 18, at 172.
59
In 1954, Congress enacted the first version of subchapter K to simplify and
add flexibility to partner taxation. Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse
Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159,
159 (2001) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954)). “Because of the hybrid
nature of partnerships as a combination of entity and aggregate features in a highly
flexible mix, it [was] inherently impossible to adopt specific rules that [would]
prohibit all types of abusive partnership transactions.” N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax
Section, supra note 54, at 236.
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arises in analyzing the partnership anti-abuse rules is why the choice
was made to focus on partnerships. That is, why was there no antiabuse rule developed for Subchapter C and other types of entities
that are taxed under the Code?”60
Certainly, abusive tax shelters were not unique to partnerships;
however, many of the abusive tax shelters at that time involved partnerships in some form.61 Taxpayers choose this business entity, in
large part, to minimize their tax obligations.62 Subchapter K was a
preferred vehicle for abusive tax schemes, in part, because of its
highly technical nature and its tax-avoidance features.63 For example, partnerships are generally treated as pass-through, or flowthrough, entities, such that the partnership entity pays no income
taxes.64 The Government did not include these features to encourage
taxpayers to minimize their tax obligations or to encourage the proliferation of tax shelters;65 however, taxpayers used the features in
this way. Thus, the Treasury focused its regulatory reform efforts on
60
“The simple answer appears to be that partnerships are what were on fire
at the time. That is, many of the transactions in the late 1980s and early 1990s that
were perceived as ‘abusive’ and that involved potentially significant deficiency
amounts involved partnerships, and the partnership anti-abuse rules were seen as
a way to put this ‘fire’ out.” James B. Sowell, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules:
Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?, 89 TAXES 69, 98–99 (2011);
see generally Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24.
Sowell, supra note 60, at 98–99 (noting that the Treasury may have avoided crafting a similar regulation for other chapters of the Code because it received such an
extremely negative reaction from the bench and bar when it enacted the partnership anti-abuse regulation). For a discussion of the controversy, see infra Section
IV.A.
61
See Sheldon I. Banoff, Anatomy of an Antiabuse Rule: What’s Really
Wrong with Reg. Section 1.701-2, 66 TAX NOTES 1859, 1860 (1995) (stating that
“[p]artnerships have become the tax shelters of the ‘90s”).
62
Partnerships are generally treated as pass-through entities; the partnership—as an entity—does not pay taxes, which helps minimize tax obligations. See
JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL
TAXATION: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 530 (3d ed. 2013). There are other tax
avoidance features as well. For example, because partnership formation is a nontaxable event, formation has no immediate tax impact. See id. This is also true for
corporate formations. See id.
63
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 4.
64
See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 62, at 530.
65
Internal Revenue Service, Partnership Industry Coordinated Issue Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule Regulation Section 1.701-2, 95 TNT 124-10, June 19,
1995, LEXIS.
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subchapter K. A question remained: how should the Treasury address the problem?
B. Choosing a Standard, Rule, or Both
In general, the Code contains a complex, detailed set of rules
rather than a compilation of general standards.66 Rules and standards
differ in significant ways, but “[t]he principal difference between
the two is that the substantive content of the law is known before an
individual acts in the case of rules, while the content of the law becomes known only after the individual acts in the case of standards.”67
While the Treasury could have tried to combat abusive tax shelters by drafting additional, narrowly-targeted rules, crafting more
rules to combat this particular abusive behavior seemed foolhardy
for a number of reasons. First, because tax abusers do their best to
conceal their behavior, the Treasury is not always aware of abuse
until long after it starts.68 Second, rule-based responses apply prospectively, leaving the Treasury one step behind as it constantly tries
to address the “latest tax gimmick.”69 Third, more rules add clutter
and complexity to an already cluttered and complex area of the
law.70 Finally, specific rules invite taxpayers to find new ways
around the fixes.71 For these reasons, the Treasury rejected the rulebased approach and instead added a standard on top of the existing
rules.72 With its standard, the Treasury specifically targeted textualism, especially literalism, because tax professionals had used it to

66

Coverdale, supra note 26, at 1521–22.
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 55.
68
Daniel L. Halperin, The Partnership Antiabuse Reg: A Reasonable Step in
the Right Direction, 64 TAX NOTES 823, 824 (1994).
69
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that the Treasury can
address the shenanigans in the tax-shelter area better by using a standard like the
anti-abuse regulation). While rule-retroactivity could help, Congress has to specifically grant the Treasury the authority to issue retroactive regulations. See
I.R.C. § 7805(b)(6) (West 2015); see also Hickman, Administering the Tax System, supra note 34, at 1719–20.
70
George W. Bush, Remarks in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 3 PUB. PAPERS
2466, 2469 (Oct. 12, 2004) (“Speaking about the Tax Code, it is a complicated
mess. It’s a million pages long.”).
71
Halperin, supra note 68, at 824.
72
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 56.
67
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become increasingly creative with tax avoidance.73 In sum, because
the traditional rule-based approach had not stopped the abuse, the
Treasury turned to a standards-based approach and promulgated the
anti-abuse regulation.74
III.

PROMULGATING THE REMEDY: THE ANTI-ABUSE
REGULATION

A. The Draft Regulation
On May 12, 1994, the Treasury and the Service issued a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) pursuant both to I.R.C.
§ 7805(a),75 its general authority to issue regulations, and to I.R.C.
§ 701,76 which subjects partners, rather than partnerships, to federal
income taxation.77 According to the NPRM, the regulation was being enacted to curtail the inappropriate use of subchapter K’s flexibility.78
The NPRM contained Proposed Regulation 1.701-2, which contained two rules, collectively referred to as the partnership antiabuse regulation, or rules:79 (1) the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule,
and (2) the Abuse-of-Entity rule. The proposed Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule provided that if entities formed a partnership or used one
73

Kenneth W. Gideon, Use, Abuse, and Anti-Abuse: Policy Considerations
Affecting the Nature of Regulatory Guidance, 73 TAXES 637, 638 (1995).
74
Caudill, Ninth Circuit, supra note 57, at 380.
75
Section 7805(a) provides in relevant part: “the Secretary shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules
and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation
to internal revenue.” I.R.C. § 7805(a) (West 2015).
76
Section 701 provides in full: “A partnership as such shall not be subject to
the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners
shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities.”
§ 701.
77
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17,
1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The NPRM indicated that proposed antiabuse rules would be added to subchapter K “to prevent the use of a partnership
to circumvent the intended purpose of a provision of the Code.” Id.
78
See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 66.
79
Sowell, supra note 60, at 69 (noting that the rules are also called the “partnership anti-abuse rules”); see, e.g., I.R.M. § 4.35.2.5.2.6 (2006). Because the
term “regulation” is confusing when it is pluralized in this context, I use the plural
“rules” or the singular “regulation” when referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2.
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in a transaction or series of transactions such that a principal purpose
was to substantially reduce a partner’s federal tax liability in a way
that was inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K,80 the Commissioner could recast the transaction.81 Similarly, the Abuse-of-Entity
language82 provided that taxpayers should not be able “to use the
existence of the partnerships to avoid the purposes of other provisions of the Code.”83
Citing the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code of
195484 and the implicit intent of subchapter K for support, the
NPRM generally stated that the intent of subchapter K was “to permit taxpayers to conduct business for joint economic profit through
a flexible arrangement that accurately reflects the partners’ economic agreement without incurring an entity-level tax.”85 The
NPRM stated further that Congress had not intended for taxpayers
to use partnerships to achieve tax results that were “inconsistent with
80

Unfortunately, the Treasury did not use terminology precisely or consistently. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)–(b) (1995) (using terminology such as
“intent of subchapter K”) (emphasis added), with Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule,
59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (using terminology such as “the intended purpose of a provision of the Code” and “the purposes of other provisions of the Code”) (emphasis
added). “The ‘intent’ language is confusing because a collection of statutes cannot
form an intent; rather, legislators, who are individuals, may form an intent regarding a statute they are enacting.” Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note
19, at 606; see Gunn, supra note 59, at 163 n.21. Statutes, which are inanimate
things incapable of thinking, can have a purpose or purposes but cannot form intent. While related, purpose and intent are not interchangeable, and this language
caused and continues to cause confusion and controversy. See, e.g., Garrett, supra
note 19, at 199 (arguing that legislative intent does not exist). Critics pounced on
the imprecise terminology, in part, because the idea of legislative intent is highly
controversial. As one tax professional challenged, “One cannot discern a legislative intent for even one provision of the partnership tax laws; moreover, one cannot legitimately ascribe an intent to an entire subchapter [subchapter K] enacted
incrementally over the course of many Congresses.” Id. at 198. Likely, the Treasury did not mean “intent”; rather, the agency meant “purpose” but used terminology imprecisely.
81
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581.
82
These rules were coupled in the proposed regulation, but were ultimately
separated in the final regulation. Thus, in the NPRM, the Abuse-of-Entity rule
was no more than Abuse-of-Entity language.
83
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581.
84
Specifically, S. REP. NO. 83-1622 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954);
H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543 (1954) (Conf. Rep.); and S. REP. NO. 94-938 (1976).
85
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581.
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the underlying economic arrangements of the parties or the substance of the transactions, or to use the existence of the partnerships
to avoid the purposes of other provisions of the Code.”86 Notably,
the proposed regulation did not refer to the judicial anti-abuse doctrines in any way.
The NPRM’s preamble noted the Treasury’s concern that taxpayers were increasingly using partnership transactions to create tax
benefits inconsistent with subchapter K and other provisions of the
Code.87 Further, the NPRM expressed the agency’s concern about
the rise of literalism to avoid tax obligations.88 Due to these concerns, and somewhat astonishingly, the proposed regulation stated
explicitly that, even if a transaction complied with the literal language of the Code and regulations, the Commissioner could recast
the transaction to further the intent of subchapter K.89
The Treasury characterized the proposed regulation as merely
“clarify[ing]” existing law and suggested that it would “affect a relatively small number of abusive large partnership transactions . . . .”90 The Treasury claimed that its purpose in promulgating
the anti-abuse regulation was to target the limited number of taxpayers who were entering “into partnerships for the sole purpose of reducing their . . . tax liability, especially packaged partnership transactions.”91
Despite the Treasury’s assertions that the proposed regulation
was merely a clarification and would affect only a small number of
transactions, the regulation was highly controversial and was perceived as administrative over-reaching and over-reacting.92 Indeed,
86

Id.
Id.
88
Id. at 25582.
89
Id. Recognizing that tax avoidance was inescapable, however, the proposed
regulation also acknowledged that reducing a partner’s aggregate federal tax liability alone would not violate the intent of subchapter K. Id.
90
Id.
91
Marino, supra note 18, at 172.
92
See, e.g., William F. Nelson, The Limits of Literalism: The Effect of Substance over Form, Clear Reflection and Business Purpose Considerations on the
Proper Interpretation of Subchapter K, 73 TAXES 641, 641, 651 (1995) (saying
that the regulation “provoked unusual, if not unprecedented, opposition from tax
professionals” and was “no less than astonishing”); Banoff, supra note 61, at 1859
(mentioning “the vociferous response in letters and at tax conferences and professional associations pro and con (largely con); the contentious public hearing; the
87
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the draft regulation caused major angst among tax professionals,
whose “reaction was immediate and vociferous . . . .”93 Tax professionals criticized the decision to recast transactions that complied
literally with the language of the tax laws even when those transactions were not consistent with the Service’s understanding of the intent of subchapter K.94 Others challenged the law as “grossly overbroad,”95 uncertain, and vague.96 Still others charged that the regulation was simply unnecessary given existing law.97 A few questioned whether the Treasury could constitutionally promulgate the
regulation, but these concerns were vague and imprecise.98
seemingly well-founded allegations of procedural violations in issuing and finalizing the regulation; [and] the reaction to and criticisms of the final regulation”);
Robert D. Comfort, Philadelphia Bar Tax Section Calls for Partnership Rule’s
Withdrawal, 94 TNT 140-31, July 20, 1994, LEXIS (noting concern that “very
few partnership transactions [would be] clearly safe from challenge under the antiabuse rule”).
93
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 34; see also Richard M. Lipton,
The Partnership Anti-Abuse Regs. Revisited: Is There Calm After the Storm?, 83
J. TAX’N 68, 68 (1995) (noting that “verbal squalls erupted at the public hearing”).
94
See William H. Caudill, ABA Tax Section Members Say Antiabuse Rule Is
Not a Valid Exercise of IRS Authority, 94 TNT 146-50, July 28, 1994, LEXIS
[hereinafter Caudill, ABA Comment]; Marino, supra note 18, at 172–73.
95
Comfort, supra note 92.
96
See, e.g., Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94; Terence Cuff, Los Angeles County Bar Urges Withdrawal of Antiabuse Reg., 94 TNT 151-40, Aug. 3,
1994, LEXIS; Robert R. Keatinge, Colorado Bar Association Members Call for
Antiabuse Reg’s Withdrawal, 94 TNT 141-29, July 21, 1994, LEXIS; Ralph
Weiland, TEI Urges Withdrawal of Partnership Antiabuse Rule, 94 TNT 140-21,
July 20, 1994, LEXIS.
97
See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 96; Elizabeth A. Case, Price Waterhouse
Says Existing Law is Sufficient to Curb Abusive Partnership Transactions, 94
TNT 141-33, July 21, 1994, LEXIS; Weiland, supra note 96; Marino, supra note
18, at 174; Bankman, Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule, supra note 56, at
271. In the revised preamble, the Treasury responded that current laws, which
allowed for case-by-case response were inadequate because this approach favored
those who were first to engage in arguably prohibited transactions. T.D. 8588,
1995-1 C.B. 109.
98
See, e.g., Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94; Cuff, supra note 96 (stating that there “are sufficient statutory and judicial authorities already available”);
cf. Caudill, Ninth Circuit, supra note 57, at 380; Bankman, Proposed Partnership
Antiabuse Rule, supra note 56, at 270 (arguing that purpose-based interpretation
should have no role in subchapter K (and the companion provisions of Subchapter
C and S) because the provisions are so arbitrary as to only allow literal interpretation).
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In response, the Treasury made “numerous and significant technical and structural modifications.”99 Relevantly, the Treasury expanded the definition of the intent of subchapter K by, in part, including the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.100 In addition,
the Treasury separated the Abuse-of-Entity language into a separate
rule.101 Despite these changes, tax professionals were not mollified:
“Considerable controversy continued to swirl even after the Regulations were issued in final form . . . . The debate and rhetoric
reached levels of acrimony that had not been seen within the tax
community in many years.”102 Even former members of the Service
and the Treasury weighed in on the issue, most of whom urged the
Treasury to withdraw the regulation.103

99
100

Sowell, supra note 60, at 72.
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b)(1) (1995); see Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note

94.
101

Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e).
Lipton, supra note 93, at 68; see also Banoff, supra note 61 (identifying
nine things wrong with the anti-abuse regulation in its final form).
103
The following individuals urged that the regulations be withdrawn: former
Commissioners of the Service Donald C. Alexander and Lawrence B. Gibbs; former Chief Counsel of the Service Abraham M. N. Shashy; former Chiefs of the
Joint Committee Staff Mark L. McConaghy, Bernard M. Shapiro, and Harry L.
Gutman; former Tax Court Judges William A. Goffe, Samuel B. Sterrett, John B.
Williams; and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy John S. Nolan.
Additionally, Kenneth W. Gideon, former Chief Counsel of the Service and former Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, criticized the regulations, but stopped
short of urging their withdrawal. See Donald C. Alexander et al., Commentators
Say Partnership Antiabuse Rule Doesn’t Satisfy Fundamental Principles for a
Workable Tax System, 95 TNT 175-28, Aug. 18, 1995, LEXIS; Lawrence B.
Gibbs & John S. Nolan, Partnership Antiabuse Rule is Broader Than Necessary,
95 TNT 175-27, Aug. 23, 1995, LEXIS; Kenneth W. Gideon, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering Attorney Says Partnership Antiabuse Rule Encourages ‘Standardless
Challenges’ by IRS Agents, 95 TNT 175-26, Aug. 29, 1995, LEXIS.
In contrast, former Chief of the Joint Committee Staff David Brockway
wrote to support the regulations. David H. Brockway, Brockway Sees Necessity
for Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, 95 TNT 190-24, Sept. 18, 1995, LEXIS; see
also Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Ex-Government Officials Challenge Partnership
Anti-Abuse Reg: An Analysis, 69 TAX NOTES 1395 (1995) (explaining, analyzing,
and rejecting the criticisms).
These prior officials articulated concerns about fairness, uncertainty, the
need for a more targeted approach, and, most relevantly, constitutional overreaching. See Alexander, supra note 103, at 2.
102
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B. The Final Regulation
The final regulation was promulgated on December 29, 1994.104
The operative rules remained largely unchanged: if taxpayers
formed a partnership or used one in a transaction or series of transactions that violated either the intent of subchapter K or the purposes
of another Code section, the Commissioner could recast the transaction or disregard the partnership entirely, treating the partnership’s
assets and activities as belonging to one or more of the partners.105
The regulation was clear that other statutory and common law doctrines continued to apply,106 meaning that the promulgation of the
regulation did not restrict the Commissioner from continuing to use
other tax laws to challenge abusive transactions, including the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.
The final regulation included the two separate rules: (1) the
Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule, which permitted the Service to recast
an abusive transaction for federal income tax purposes to achieve
tax results that are consistent with subchapter K;107 and (2) the
Abuse-of-Entity rule, which allowed the Service to disregard a partnership entity and treat the partnership as an aggregate of its partners
as appropriate to carry out the purposes of any provision in the Code
or in the regulations.108 Each rule is described in more detail below.
First, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule authorized the Commissioner to disregard and recast a partnership transaction if (1) a principal purpose of the transaction was to reduce substantially the partners’ aggregate federal tax liability, and (2) the manner in which the
liability was reduced was inconsistent with the intent of subchapter

104
Treas. Reg. §1.701-2. The regulation, as originally drafted, would have applied to the interpretation of any provision of the Code (income, estate, gift, generation-skipping, and excise tax) when relevant to a particular partnership transaction. See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May
17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The Treasury soon amended the
regulation to apply to income taxes only (taxes imposed under Subchapter A).
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(h).
105
Treas. Reg. §1.701-2(b)(1).
106
Id. § 1.701-2(i).
107
Id. § 1.701-2(b).
108
Id. § 1.701-2(e).
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K.109 To be consistent with “the intent of subchapter K,” a transaction had to comply with the following three110 factors (two of which
were adapted from the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines):
 The business-purpose factor: “The partnership must be
bona fide and each partnership transaction or series of
related transactions . . . must be entered into for a substantial business purpose”;
 The substance-over-form factor: “The form of each
partnership transaction must be respected under substance over form principles”; and
 The clear-reflection-of-income factor: “[T]he tax consequences . . . to each partner of partnership operations
and of transactions between the partner and the partnership must accurately reflect the partners’ economic
agreement” and the tax consequences must clearly reflect income.111
Generally speaking, if a transaction fails to meet any one of these
three factors, the Commissioner can recast the transaction.112 The
Treasury claimed that these three factors reflected the intent of subchapter K because, when Congress enacted subchapter K, Congress
intended to allow taxpayers to conduct joint business activities using

109

Id. § 1.701-2(b).
Because the Treasury subdivided the section into three subsections, most
commentators identify only three factors. See, e.g., Marino, supra note 18, at 175
(calling the factors “a three-fold requirement”). However, two of the subsections
contain two factors, making for a total of five factors. See Lipton, supra note 93,
at 68–69 (identifying five factors). Following the regulation’s structure, I use the
term “three” rather than “five.”
111
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(1)–(3).
112
However, the clear-reflection-of-income factor contains an exception. Because some provisions of subchapter K and its regulations were enacted to promote administrative convenience or were enacted for other policy reasons, a particular provision may produce tax results that do not clearly reflect income. Lipton, supra note 93, at 68. The clearest examples are basis adjustments under Sections 732 and 754. Marino, supra note 18, at 174. For this reason, the regulation
states that if the business-purpose factor and the substance-over-form factor are
both met, then the clear-reflection-of-income factor is presumed to be satisfied so
long as “the ultimate tax results . . . are clearly contemplated by that [tax] provision.” Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3).
110
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flexible economic arrangements without incurring a tax simply for
forming the entity (known as an “entity-level” tax).113
In addition to identifying these factors, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule explicitly rejected literalism: “even though the transaction
may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory or regulatory provision, the Commissioner can” recast the transaction.114 In
addition, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule also provided more than
ten examples illustrating its application.115
In sum, the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule allows the Commissioner to re-characterize a partnership transaction to achieve tax results consistent with the Treasury’s understanding of the intent of
subchapter K. In doing so, the Commissioner should consider
whether (1) a principal purpose of the transaction was to substantially reduce the partners’ aggregate federal income tax liability, and
(2) the transaction failed the three-factor test.116

113

See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a); see also Internal Revenue Service, supra note

65.
114
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2(b) identifies
the ways that the Commissioner can recast the transaction, including by (1) disregarding the partnership; (2) not treating a purported partner as a partner; (3) adjusting the partner or partnership’s methods of accounting to clearly reflect income; (4) reallocating the partnership’s income, gain, loss, deductions, or credit;
and (5) adjusting the claimed tax treatment.
115
Marino, supra note 18, at 172. Shortly after issuance, the IRS withdrew
two of the examples. Id. (citing IRS Announcement 95-8, I.R.B. 1995-7 (Jan. 23,
1995) and T.D. 8592 (April 12, 1995). See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d) (containing
eleven examples). Eight of these examples are safe harbors, meaning that if a
transaction is structured similarly to the example, then the Commissioner will not
re-characterize it, while five of the examples illustrate transactions subject to recasting.
116
More specifically, the transaction must fail the three-factor test in light of
the pertinent facts and circumstances of the particular transaction. These pertinent
facts and circumstances are identified in section 1.701-2(c). Section 1.701-2(c)
identifies non-exclusive factors and circumstances for determining whether the
“principal purpose test” would be satisfied. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(c). These
factors include, among others, the purpose for the transaction, the aggregate tax
liability of all the partners, and the intent of subchapter K. Id. However, the most
important factor is the comparison of the business purpose for the transaction with
the resulting tax benefits. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 37–38. But
see Lipton, supra note 93, at 69 (“Because these factors are nonconclusive and
are ‘result oriented’ in that they focus on whether the partners receive a tax benefit
from the use of a partnership—which generally will occur when a partnership is
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The final regulation also included the Abuse-of-Entity Rule.117
The Abuse-of-Entity rule provides that “[t]he Commissioner can
treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole or in part
as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder.”118
However, the Commissioner may not reject a taxpayer’s decision to
form a partnership to avoid another Code provision if that other provision clearly allows partnership treatment and the ensuing tax consequences.119 With this proviso, the Treasury backed away from its
position in the proposed regulation that an arrangement would be
abusive per se if the taxpayer intended to “avoid the purposes of
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”120
When the Treasury first proposed the anti-abuse regulation, the
tax bar fought back, alleging that the Treasury had exceeded its executive powers and had acted without constitutional or statutory authority.121 Those who supported the regulation countered these chal-

used in a transaction—the factors provide little guidance beyond the tests set forth
in the Regulations.”).
While there are often multiple reasons for structuring a transaction in a
particular way, including reducing tax liability, the Treasury was concerned with
whether the tax reduction purpose was “a principal purpose.” If so, then the regulation will apply and the Service may recast the transaction, although the Service
is not required to do so. See Treas. Reg. 1.701-2(c). Thus, if the claimed tax benefits are too favorable, even though the transaction served a legitimate business
purpose, the Service need not respect the transaction. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 38.
117
In the final rule, the Treasury moved the Abuse-of-Entity language from
the proposed regulation, which entirely ignored taxpayer intent, into a new subsection and modified it. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e).
118
Id. §1.701-2(e)(1). Aggregate treatment would not apply when “(i) [a] provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder
prescribes the treatment of a partnership as an entity, in whole or in part, and (ii)
[t]hat treatment and the ultimate tax results, taking into account all the relevant
facts and circumstances, are clearly contemplated by that provision.” Id. §1.7012(e)(2).
119
Id. § 1.701-2(e)(2).
120
Marino, supra note 18, at 174. The Abuse-of-Entity rule also provided
three examples illustrating its application. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(f).
121
See, e.g., Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94; Cunningham & Repetti,
supra note 24, at 5; James A. Gouwar, The Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse
Regulation: Treasury Oversteps Its Authority, 11 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX’N 287,
289–90 (1995); Comfort, supra note 92; Charles R. Levun, Chicago Bar Calls
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lenges by suggesting that the Treasury already possessed legal authority to act.122 Despite the rhetoric, neither side fully explored the
constitutional or statutory issues at that time.
Professors Cunningham and Repetti were the first to address
these issues in depth.123 They concluded that the Treasury’s promulgation of the anti-abuse regulation was not administrative overreaching but was, instead, a legitimate exercise of executive authority entitled to deference under Chevron.124 Their conclusion rests on
two points: First, they declare that Congress has the constitutional
power to tell courts to use a specific method of statutory interpretation to analyze a statute.125 Because Congress chose not to adopt a
method, they continue, Congress left a gap in this area for the Treasury to fill.126 Second, they assert that Congress could have codified
the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.127 Because Congress
chose not to codify these doctrines, they argue, Congress left a gap
in this area as well.128 Under Chevron, agencies have implied delegated power to interpret ambiguous statutory language and fill statutory gaps.129 From this truism, Professors Cunningham and Repetti
assume that Congress’s silence in these two areas empowered the

Partnership Antiabuse Rule Invalid, Urges Withdrawal, 94 TNI 139-17, June 30,
1994, LEXIS.
Critics argued that to the extent that there is uncertainty in the statutory
scheme of subchapter K about the role of business purpose, economic substance,
and the proper reflection of income, the regulation was not a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 39
n.196 (collecting sources).
122
See, e.g., Bankman, Proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule, supra note 56,
at 272 (“The proposed regulation does not add any power the Treasury does not
now possess, under a combination of common-law antiabuse doctrines and its residual power to interpret tax laws in light of their underlying purpose.”); Halperin,
supra note 68, at 823 (stating “the Treasury and the IRS have the legal authority
to issue the proposed regulation”).
123
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24.
124
Id. at 5.
125
Id. at 5–6, 53 (citing Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2130 (2002)).
126
Id. at 5–6.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
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Treasury to issue both rules in the anti-abuse regulation.130 However, their arguments are flawed.
Their arguments are flawed because an agency cannot legally
act beyond its delegated authority. An agency may attempt to exceed
its delegated authority in two ways. First, an agency may act unconstitutionally by performing actions that Congress could not or did
not delegate to the agency.131 For example, Congress cannot delegate to the Treasury the power to appoint Supreme Court justices
because the Constitution gives that power to the President (with the
Senate’s consent).132 And, although Congress could delegate to the
Treasury the power to regulate the environment, Congress has not
done so.133 Were the Treasury to do either (appoint Supreme Court
justices or regulate the environment), the Treasury’s action would
be unconstitutional because the Treasury would be acting without
any delegated authority.
Second, and more commonly, an agency may act ultra vires by
regulating in a way that exceeds the scope of the authority Congress
delegated to the agency. For example, Congress delegated to the
Treasury the authority “to regulate the practice of representatives of
persons before the Department of the Treasury.”134 Pursuant to that
delegation, the Treasury claimed it had power to promulgate a rule
regulating tax-return preparers.135 The D.C. Circuit Court held that
the Treasury exceeded its delegated authority because “representa-

130

See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5–6.
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). All legislative powers are vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Hence, agencies
cannot act absent delegation from Congress. Congress may delegate legislative
power to an agency pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8. However, Congress must provide an agency with intelligible principles to
guide the exercise of any delegated power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457,
474–76 (2001).
132
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
133
Instead, Congress has delegated that power to the Environmental Protection Agency. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012) (requiring the EPA to
regulate air emissions); id. §§ 300f–300j (requiring the EPA to establish minimum
standards to protect tap water).
134
Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 31 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1)).
135
Id.
131
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tives of persons before the Department of the Treasury” did not include tax-preparers.136 Because the Treasury exceeded the power
delegated, the agency’s action was ultra vires.137 The action was not
unconstitutional, however, because Congress delegated some power
to the agency, specifically, the authority “to regulate the practice of
representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury.”138
The Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation is unconstitutional or, alternatively, ultra vires. The regulation is unconstitutional because
Congress cannot and did not delegate the power the agency claimed.
Alternatively, if such power were properly delegated, then the
Treasury exceeded the bounds of that delegated power and, thus,
acted ultra vires. In the next two parts of the Article, I explain why
the Treasury’s act was unconstitutional and why, alternatively, it
was ultra vires.
IV.
PART FOUR: EVALUATING THE REMEDY
The Treasury’s promulgation of the anti-abuse regulation is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, Congress cannot delegate
power that the legislature does not have. Because Congress does not
have the power to tell the judiciary how to interpret statutes, it cannot delegate that power to the Treasury. Second, Congress did not
explicitly or implicitly delegate power to the Treasury either to tell
the judiciary how to interpret statutes or to codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines. Because the Treasury promulgated a
regulation without delegated authority, the anti-abuse regulation is
unconstitutional.

136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 1015–16.
31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1).
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A. Congress Cannot Delegate
Congress cannot delegate power that it does not have,139 and
Congress has no power to enact statutory directives.140 Statutory directives are laws telling the judiciary how to interpret statutes.141
More specifically, theoretical statutory directives tell judges what
theory, or approach, to use to interpret statutes: purposivism, intentionalism, textualism, or something else.142 The Treasury’s regulation includes two theoretical directives. One such directive is located
within the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule. This directive applies to interpretations of specific provisions within subchapter K. The other
directive is located within the Abuse-of-Entity rule. This directive
applies to interpretations of the entire code.143
139

Cf., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 323
(2000) (“[A]ny delegation must itself be an exercise of lawmaking authority, operating pursuant to the constitutional requirements for the making of federal
law.”).
140
See Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 837, 886 (2009) [hereinafter Jellum, Which is to be Master].
141
Id. at 847–48.
142
Id. at 848–49. Congress has not enacted a general statutory directive. For
examples of state theoretical directives, see the following statutes: TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2013) (purposivism); N.Y. STAT. LAW § 92(a)–(b)
(McKinney 2014) (intentionalism); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (West 2014) (textualism).
143
Professors Cunningham and Repetti suggest that the anti-abuse regulation
includes a third purposivist directive as well. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra
note 24, at 37. Specifically, they note that the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule includes a three-factor test to define when a transaction is consistent with the “intent
of subchapter K.” Id. The first two factors are required (the business-purpose and
substance-over-form factors), while the third factor (the clear-reflection-of-income factor) is required only sometimes. Id. The clear reflection of income factor
is not always required because certain provisions in subchapter K and its regulations were adopted to promote administrative convenience or for other policy reasons. Id. In other words, some provisions were enacted with the recognition that
their application to a particular transaction could, “in some circumstances, produce tax results that do not properly reflect income.” Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(3).
Thus, pursuant to the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule, if the first two factors are met,
the third factor is also considered to be met “to the extent that the application of
such a provision to the transaction and the ultimate tax results, taking into account
all the relevant facts and circumstances, are clearly contemplated by that provision.” Id. (emphasis added). Professors Cunningham and Repetti conclude that
“this provision of the regulation in effect requires that the purposivist method of
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The Abuse-of-Subchapter-K theoretical directive tells the Commissioner to reject textualism’s kissing cousin, literalism, and to use
purposivism. This directive states that “even though the transaction
may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory or regulatory provision, the Commissioner can” recast the transaction “to
achieve tax results that are consistent with the intent of subchapter
K . . . .”144 In other words, if a literal interpretation would frustrate
the purpose of subchapter K,145 then the Commissioner can ignore
literalism in favor of an approach that furthers the purpose of the
statute. The Abuse-of-Subchapter-K theoretical directive applies to
interpretations of statutes within subchapter K only.146
Like the theoretical directive in the Abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule,
the Abuse-of-Entity rule similarly instructs the Commissioner to use
purposivism.147 This theoretical directive provides: “The Commissioner can treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole
or in part as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of
the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder.”148 Pursuant to this directive, the Commissioner can determine
whether to treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners or as a
separate entity to further the purposes of any provisions in the Code
or the regulations promulgated thereunder, so long as the tax results
of that treatment “are clearly contemplated.”149 Thus, the Abuse-ofstatutory interpretation be used in analyzing subchapter K.” Cunningham &
Repetti, supra note 24, at 37. Professors Cunningham and Repetti interpreted the
phrase “contemplated by the provision” as requiring a determination of the purpose of the statute. See Email from James Repetti (Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with
author). It is not clear, however, that the statute requires a determination of the
purpose. Why, for example, could one not satisfy this provision by determining
what the statute contemplated through a textualist analysis of, say, the provision
itself or the act as a whole? Hence, I am not convinced that it is a purposivist
theoretical directive.
144
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b).
145
See supra note 80 (discussing how the Treasury inappropriately conflated
statutory purpose and legislative intent).
146
Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2(b) speaks only of subchapter K, while
Treasury Regulation section 1.701-2(e)(2) applies more broadly. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.701-2(b), (e)(2).
147
See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 38, 51.
148
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e) (emphasis added).
149
Additionally, the Code or regulations must specifically allow for entity
treatment. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(2).
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Entity theoretical directive applies broadly to interpretations of statutes in the entire Code and its regulations. In short, both the Abuseof-Subchapter-K rule and the Abuse-of-Entity rule include purposivist theoretical directives.150
As a threshold issue, one might question whether the judiciary
would be bound to follow purposivist directives the Treasury issued.151 The regulation explicitly directs only the Commissioner, not
the judiciary, to use purposivism.152 Likely, the Treasury can tell the
Service to use a particular approach to interpretation without violating separation of powers. Moreover, the courts could simply ignore
the theoretical directives in the anti-abuse regulation.153 Yet, were
taxpayers to appeal a Commissioner’s decision that recasts a particular partnership transaction and denies benefits under either rule in
the anti-abuse regulation, a court would have to review the Commissioner’s decision. In reviewing that decision, the court would have
to (1) determine whether the Commissioner had authority to recast
the transaction under the regulation (a Chevron-type or Auer-type
question) and, assuming the Commissioner had that authority, (2)
determine whether that decision was valid (an arbitrary-and-capricious-type question).154 If the Commissioner were to use a purposivist approach to recast a transaction that literally complied with the
language of an applicable tax statute, a court refusing to follow the
directive might well find the recasting invalid. Hence, although not

150

The summary section of the NPRM says specifically, “[t]he rule authorizes
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in certain circumstances, to recast a transaction involving the use of a partnership to reflect the underlying economic arrangement under subchapter K or to prevent the use of a partnership to circumvent
the intended purpose of a provision of the Code.” Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule,
59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
151
Professors Cunningham and Repetti do not address this question but assume the judiciary are bound. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5. I
agree.
152
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b), (e).
153
See, e.g., Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 550 (Del. 2005) (finding that a
textualist theoretical directive violated separation of powers and refusing to follow it).
154
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). Standard of review is a particularly murky area.
For a discussion of the appropriate level of deference in economic substance
cases, see generally Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the
Standard of Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339 (2009).
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explicit, the anti-abuse regulation implicitly directs judicial interpretation as well as executive interpretation. Indeed, if the judiciary
were not bound, the regulation would be largely ineffective.
Assuming the judiciary is bound to follow these directives because of judicial review standards, the question becomes: “Where
does the Treasury get the authority to instruct a court as to which
method of interpretation it should use to interpret a tax statute?”155
In my opinion, nowhere. Congress has no power to direct courts on
how to interpret statutes.156 Because Congress cannot delegate
power it does not have, the Treasury’s decision to adopt these directives is unconstitutional.
Professors Cunningham and Repetti acknowledge that “it may
seem inappropriate for the Treasury to instruct the judiciary on how
and when the courts should apply judicial doctrines and what tools
they should use in interpreting statutes.”157 Yet both professors believe that Congress has the constitutional power to enact statutory
directives and that its failure to do so left this gap for the agency to
fill.158 To support their claim that Congress has the power to issue
such directives, Professors Cunningham and Repetti cite Professor
Nicholas Rosenkranz.159 Professor Rosenkranz has indeed argued
that Congress can constitutionally enact theoretical directives.160 As
I have explained elsewhere, and as others have agreed, Professor
Rosenkranz’s argument is misguided; Congress cannot enact theoretical directives without violating separation of powers.161

155

Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5.
Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 882–83.
157
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 5.
158
Id. at 53.
159
Id. at 53 n.283.
160
See Rosenkranz, supra note 125, at 2103–10.
161
Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 847; accord ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 245 (2012) (saying that any attempt by Congress to direct statutory interpretation would likely be unconstitutional); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 292 n.85 (2011) (“I entertain the possibility
that statutory interpretation involves a judicial function implicit in Article III’s
vesting of the judicial power in the courts.”); Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT.
L. REV. 229, 260 (2004) (“I join the ranks in believing construing statutes is what
courts do and determining how to best perform this role should remain the prov156
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Theoretical directives violate the formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of powers. Were it to issue a theoretical directive, Congress would violate the formalist approach to separation
of powers quite simply because Congress would be performing a
judicial act.162 Theoretical directives do not affect legal rights;163
hence, they are not legislative in nature.164 Indeed, affecting legal
rights is not a directive’s purpose. Rather, a directive’s purpose is to
tell the judiciary how to interpret statutes.165 Yet, interpreting statutes is a quintessential judicial act.166 Determining what sources to
consider when deciding what a statute means is essential to the interpretive process. Were Congress to craft a theoretical directive,
like the ones in the anti-abuse regulation, Congress would interfere
ince of the courts.”); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 97, 99–100 (2003); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Continuation Coverage Under COBRA: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 22 J. LEGIS. 195, 210 n.103
(1996) (“One unanswered question is whether Congress could pass a general interpretive law stating that a particular method should be used to interpret certain
statutes. Such an approach would likely be unconstitutional because it destroys
the concept of separation of powers.”); REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 263–81 (1975) (noting potential constitutional
problems raised by interpretive acts); Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 221 (1994) (“At least some interpretive directions might violate the principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial branches.”); James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction
When Legislation is Viewed as a Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 211
n.85 (1965) (“When a statute seeks to control the attitude or the subjective
thoughts of the judiciary, the separation of powers doctrine has been ignored.”).
162
For a more complete explanation of why theoretical directives violate formalist separation of powers, see Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at
882–83.
163
Article I vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1. Laws “alter[] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952
(1983). Congress alters legal rights through enacting, amending, and repealing
statutes. Hence, legislative power is the power “to promulgate generalized standards and requirements of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to achieve,
maintain, or avoid particular social policy results.” Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth
J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 479 (1991).
164
See Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 882–83.
165
Id. at 848.
166
Id. at 888.

184

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:152

with a judicial function: interpreting statutes.167 “If officials in either
[the executive or legislative] branches were given final say over statutory interpretation . . . this would sabotage both the constitutionally
prescribed law-making procedures and the constitutional separation
of powers.”168
Additionally, were it to issue a theoretical directive, Congress
would violate the functionalist approach to separation of powers.169
Functionalists fear undue encroachment and aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of another.170 Theoretical directives raise encroachment concerns because these directives impermissibly allow
Congress to intrude into a core judicial function: interpreting the
law.171 “Say[ing] what the law means”172 is not just a core function
of the judiciary, “it is the most central constitutionally assigned
function of the judiciary, as found in the vesting clause.”173 Theoretical directives raise aggrandizement concerns as well because
they expand, or aggrandize, Congress’s role in the interpretive process.174 Thus, theoretical directives violate functionalist as well as
formalist approaches to separation of powers. Hence, Congress has
no power to issue a theoretical directive.175 Because Congress has
no power to issue such a directive itself, Congress cannot delegate
this power to the Treasury.

167

Article III of the Constitution vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States” in the courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Judicial power is the power to
interpret laws and resolve legal disputes. “[T]o declare what the law is, or has
been, is a judicial power, to declare what the law shall be is legislative.” Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668, 678 (1881) (quoting Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S.
272, 277 (1804)). Thus, “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523, 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
168
Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2002).
169
For a more complete explanation of why theoretical directives violate functionalist separation of powers, see Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140,
at 883–90.
170
See id. at 870, 875.
171
Id. at 883.
172
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
173
Jellum, Which is to be Master, supra note 140, at 883.
174
Id. at 886–87.
175
Id. at 882–83.
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This outcome makes sense. The appropriate theory for judges to
use when interpreting statutes is highly complex and controversial.176 The choice, however, should be left to the judiciary, not
usurped by Congress or the Treasury.
In sum, contrary to Professor Rosenkranz’s argument, Congress
does not have the power to direct the judiciary to use a particular
approach to statutory interpretation. Because Congress has no such
power, Congress has no capacity to explicitly or implicitly delegate
this power to the Treasury. Hence, the Treasury had no delegated
authority to issue the directives, and the regulation, or at least the
directives within the regulation, are unconstitutional.
B. Congress Did Not Delegate
Even if I am wrong, and Congress had the ability to delegate the
power to issue theoretical directives to the Treasury, Congress did
not do so. Nor did Congress delegate to the Treasury the power to
adopt and modify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines. The
Treasury has no power to act unless and until Congress confers, or
delegates, power upon it.177 In this case, Congress did not do so.
Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch; as
such, they execute the laws that Congress enacts.178 Agencies may

176
For the classic debate between Professors John Manning and William
Eskridge, Jr., regarding this issue, compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23 (2001), with William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 993 (2001) (criticizing Professor Manning’s article), and John F. Manning, Response: Deriving Rules of
Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM L. REV. 1648, 1651–
53 (2001) (responding to Professor Eskridge’s criticism).
177
Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 372 F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
178
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986); accord Redish & Cisar, supra
note 163, at 480 (“[T]he executive branch must be exercising . . . creativity, judgment, or discretion in an ‘implementational’ context. In other words, the executive
branch must be interpreting or enforcing a legislative choice or judgment; its actions cannot amount to the exercise of free-standing legislative power.”); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1936) (noting that executive power is the power to prescribe rules and regulations to carry into effect
congressional will).
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exercise only the power that Congress explicitly or implicitly delegates to them.179 Pursuant to the delegation, or non-delegation, doctrine, Congress explicitly delegates power to agencies to promulgate
regulations with the force and effect of law and ostensibly constrains
that power by providing “intelligible principles.”180 Intelligible principles guide and limit agency decision-making while also allowing
for judicial review.181 Congress impliedly delegates power to an
agency to interpret the laws it administers when it executes those
laws.182 Thus, delegation may be express (explicit) or implied (implicit).
When Congress explicitly delegates power to an agency to elucidate a specific provision of a statute by regulation, courts review
the resulting regulation to see if it is arbitrary, capricious,183 or manifestly contrary to the statute.184 In contrast, when Congress implicitly delegates power to an agency to fill statutory gaps or resolve
statutory ambiguities, then courts review the resulting regulation under Chevron to see if the interpretation is reasonable.185 Notably,
however, without an explicit or implicit delegation of authority from
Congress, both arbitrary and capricious review and reasonableness

179

Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986) (“[A]n agency’s power is no
greater than that delegated to it by Congress.”); Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“It is central to the
real meaning of the rule of law . . . that a federal agency does not have the power
to act unless Congress, by statute, has empowered it to do so.”).
180
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409–11
(1928).
181
WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN, MASTERING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12 (2010).
182
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984).
183
5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
184
Wright v. Everson, 543 F.3d 649, 654 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. at 844).
185
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
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review are inapplicable.186 Without delegated authority, an agency
has no power to act at all.187
The next section (Part IV.B.1) explores whether Congress expressly delegated either power to the Treasury. The section following (Part IV.B.2) explores whether Congress impliedly delegated either power to the Treasury. In both cases, the answer is “no.”
1. CONGRESS DID NOT EXPLICITLY DELEGATE
Congress may expressly delegate the power to implement legislative policy to an agency so long as Congress constrains that power
with intelligible principles.188 Had Congress explicitly delegated the
power to the Treasury to adopt an interpretive approach for interpreting subchapter K (assuming Congress had such power to delegate) or had Congress explicitly delegated the power to adopt and
modify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines, then the
Treasury would have had the power to enact the regulation at issue.
Yet Congress did neither.
In the NPRM, the Treasury identified two statutes as providing
authority for the agency to promulgate the anti-abuse regulation:
I.R.C. §§ 7805(a) and 701.189 However, neither statute provides the
186

Id. (stating that where Congress has left a gap, “there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation”); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415
(1971) (“The court is first required to decide whether the Secretary acted within
the scope of his authority.”); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”) (quoting
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)).
187
All legislative powers are vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Hence, agencies cannot act absent delegation from Congress. Congress may delegate legislative power to an agency pursuant to the necessary and proper clause.
Id. § 8. However, Congress must provide an agency with intelligible principles to
guide the exercise of any delegated power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457,
474 (2001).
188
Many suggest that the non-delegation doctrine is dead because the Supreme Court has not invalidated a federal statute on such grounds, notwithstanding a number of opportunities, since 1935; however, Professor Cass Sunstein suggests that the non-delegation constraint has been relocated within interpretation
canons rather than abandoned. Sunstein, supra note 139, at 315–16.
189
See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May
17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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Treasury with an explicit grant of authority to promulgate the theoretical directives or to modify the judicially developed anti-abuse
doctrines.
Section 7805(a) does not expressly grant such power. Instead,
§ 7805(a) delegates power to the Treasury to “prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the tax laws.190 Pursuant to this statute, the Treasury has the power to promulgate tax regulations with the force of law.191 Section 7805(a) is, thus, a general
grant of authority to the Treasury to promulgate regulations. But the
statute provides no explicit guidance on what those regulations
should contain (other than that they be needful and related to tax).192
Thus, § 7805(a) alone does not explicitly give the Treasury the
power to issue theoretical directives, to codify the judicial anti-abuse
doctrines, or, for that matter, to enact any specific rule. Hence, the
Treasury must find that power in another, more specific provision in
the Code, like § 701.
Yet § 701 does not expressly delegate these powers either. Section 701 provides simply that “[a] partnership as such shall not be
190
I.R.C. § 7805(a). Professors Cunningham and Repetti might argue that
Congress explicitly delegated both powers (and apparently countless others) because the § 7805(a) specifically grants the Treasury the authority to “prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the tax laws]. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 48 (citing I.R.C. § 7805(a)). In their view, a
needful rule for enforcement of the tax laws would include both a method to interpret those rules and the power to codify the judicial anti-abuse rules.
Yet consider the breadth of power the Treasury would have were this argument correct. The Treasury might decide that a needful rule for enforcing the
tax code is one in which tax return preparers are subject to licensing, or is one
extending the limitations period for the government to assess a deficiency against
a taxpayer for overstating the basis in property, or is one allowing employees to
carry guns to audits for safety. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (rejecting the Treasury’s attempt to regulate tax preparers); United States
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1839 (2012) (rejecting the
Treasury’s attempt to extend the limitations period).
It seems unlikely that Congress intended to give the Treasury the power to
enact any rule that the Treasury decided was needed. Rather, Congress likely intended to give the Treasury the power to enact rules that Congress decided were
needed to implement and enforce statutes. Cf. Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB,
721 F.3d 152, 161 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that despite statutory language granting the NLRB the authority to issue rules “necessary to carry out” the provisions
of a statute, the NLRB had no authority to issue a specific rule).
191
I.R.C. § 7805(a).
192
See id.
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subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying
on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their
separate or individual capacities.”193 Like § 7805(a), § 701 does not
explicitly grant to the Treasury either the power to promulgate the
theoretical directives or the power to modify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.
Thus, neither of the statutes, considered separately or combined,
explicitly delegates power to the Treasury either to promulgate statutory directives or to codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines for subchapter K. Thus, if delegation exists at all, it must be
implicit.
2. CONGRESS DID NOT IMPLICITLY DELEGATE
Not only did Congress not explicitly delegate either power to the
Treasury, Congress did not implicitly delegate such power either.
Congress was simply silent, and silence alone is not congressional
delegation.194
Without a doubt, congressional delegation of authority to an
agency need not be express; it may instead be implied.195 Congress
explicitly delegates authority to an agency to fill statutory gaps.196
Congress implicitly delegates authority to an agency to resolve statutory ambiguity197 because courts presume “that when an agency193

Id. § 701.
Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. at 1843 (“[A] statute’s silence or ambiguity as to a particular issue means that Congress has not ‘directly addressed
the precise question at issue’ . . . .”) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)) (emphasis added); Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 159 (noting that there is no presumption that Congress delegated a specific power to an agency based solely on the fact that the legislature
did not expressly withhold such power); Feller v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 497, 535
(2010) (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (“Statutory specificity about one subject cannot
sensibly be construed as gap-creating ‘silence’ about other subjects.”); Am. Bar
Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that requiring agencies
to expressly withhold power would give agencies “virtually limitless hegemony”).
195
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
196
Id.
197
As the Supreme Court noted, an agency’s power to administer a congressionally developed program “necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left . . . by Congress.” Id. Further, Chevron
applies, we are told, when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue before a court. Id.
194
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administered statute is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes,
Congress has empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity.”198
Hence, when a statute contains ambiguity and an agency resolves
that ambiguity, courts use the two-step deference standard identified
in Chevron to review the validity of the agency’s interpretive
choice.199
Pursuant to Chevron,200 a court determines at step one “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”201 In
essence, Chevron’s first step asks whether Congress implicitly delegated resolution of any ambiguity to the agency or retained that
power for itself.202 When applying this first step, courts do not defer
198

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014) (emphasis
added).
199
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. Not all agency interpretations of ambiguous language are entitled to Chevron deference; some receive Skidmore deference. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Before applying
Chevron, a court must make sure that the interpretation is one deserving of Chevron. Agency interpretations made using force-of-law procedures are entitled to
Chevron deference while those made with less formal process are not. United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty.,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Here, there is no question that the Treasury used forceof-law procedures when promulgating its anti-abuse regulation because the Treasury used notice-and-comment procedures. For a discussion of IRS actions that do
not warrant Chevron deference, see Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No
Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 256–57
(2009).
200
Congress’s general grant of authority to the Treasury under § 7805(a) to
issue regulations necessary to enforce the Code provides sufficient authority for
the Treasury to issue legislative rules interpreting § 701 and other sections of the
Code. The Supreme Court recently held that the Treasury has the power to interpret all the statutes it administers pursuant to its general grant of authority
(§ 7805(a)). Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44, 56 (2011). Further, the Court held that the Treasury’s interpretation of a particular statute, like § 701, is owed no less deference when it is contained in a rule
adopted under the general grant of authority in § 7805(a) “than when it is ‘issued
under a specific grant of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method
of executing a statutory provision.’” Id. (quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States,
452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)).
201
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. In other words, is Congress’s intent clear—however clarity may be discerned—or is there a gap or ambiguity to be resolved?
Clarity is determined by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction . . . .” Id. at 843 n.9.
202
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843
(2012).
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to an agency’s interpretation at all. Rather, “[t]he judiciary is the
final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”203 If the answer to this first question is yes, then that
is the end of the matter, “for the court, as well as the agency must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”204
If the answer is no, however, courts turn to Chevron’s second step.
At Chevron’s second step, courts must accept any reasonable, or
permissible, agency interpretation.205
Importantly, however, agencies are not entitled to Chevron deference for every interpretation they issue. Chevron deference is only
appropriate when an agency interprets ambiguous statutory language and when Congress has delegated authority to that agency to
resolve that ambiguity.206 When Congress does not delegate such
interpretive authority, agencies have no interpretive power, even in
the face of ambiguous language.207 In sum, for Chevron’s second
step to apply, a court must find at Chevron’s first step that Congress
implicitly delegated resolution of any ambiguities to the agency.208
203

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1199 (D. Colo. 2008), rev’d,
613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43).
205
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
206
See Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Mere ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.”);
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(“[Chevron] deference comes into play, of course, only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation
of authority to the agency.”); City of Kansas City v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that “implicit delegation of interpretive authority” and ambiguity are required before Chevron-step-two deference is
appropriate).
207
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (noting that “[i]n extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation [simply from ambiguous language].”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
159 (2000)).
208
When Congress expressly delegates, then the proper standard of review is
arbitrary and capricious review. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; ABF Freight Sys., Inc.
v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (“When Congress expressly delegates to an
administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts
must give the agency’s decision controlling weight unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”) (quoting id. at 844).
204
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a. Silence Is Not Delegation
Professors Cunningham and Repetti suggest that Congress impliedly delegated both powers to the Treasury through silence.209
Regarding the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines, the professors correctly point out that Congress could have codified these doctrines had it wished, but Congress did not do so.210 Regarding the
theoretical directives, the professors erroneously claim211 that Congress could have enacted theoretical directives telling “courts to use
a specific method of statutory interpretation in analyzing a statute . . . .”212 Again, they note that Congress did not do so.213 From
these two instances of congressional silence, the professors conclude that “the statute does not address the subject matter of the regulation[] . . . .”214 Because no statute addresses the subject matter of
the regulation, Professors Cunningham and Repetti conclude that
the first step of Chevron is satisfied; Congress did not speak to the
precise issue.215 Hence, the only question remaining is whether the
Treasury’s interpretation was reasonable, pursuant to the second
step of Chevron.216 In short, the professors assert the Treasury had
the power to promulgate the anti-abuse regulation merely because
Congress did not expressly withhold that power.217 For the professors, silence satisfies Chevron’s first step.218
I disagree. A number of courts have rightly rejected the argument that silence alone is sufficient to satisfy Chevron’s first step.219
209

Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53.
Id. Congress did codify the economic-substance doctrine in 2010. Congress codified the doctrine through § 1409 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.
211
I disagree. See supra Section IV.A.
212
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 54.
215
Id. at 53 (stating only that “[t]he existence of [the common law doctrines]
and the use of the purposivist method of statutory interpretation . . . squarely confronted Congress with the issue whether, as a policy matter, the doctrines should
apply when interpreting the partnership tax provisions”).
216
Id. at 54.
217
See supra notes 209–215.
218
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53.
219
See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“Courts encountering this kind of ‘whatever-it-takes’ approach to Chevron analysis in the past have rejected it.”); Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C.
210
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For example, in American Bar Association v. FTC,220 the D.C. Circuit rejected this silence-equals-delegated-power argument. The
statute at issue in that case empowered the Federal Trade Commission to regulate “financial institutions.”221 The FTC attempted to
regulate attorneys, claiming that they were “financial institutions.”222 The issue for the court was whether the FTC’s interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference. The FTC argued that because the statute was silent on this issue—meaning that it did not
contain language specifically exempting attorneys or the practice of
law from regulation—the FTC had the power to regulate both.223
The court was relatively scathing in its rebuke of the agency’s silence argument:
As we have often cautioned, “[t]o suggest, as the
[Commission] effectively does, that Chevron step
two is implicated any time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power . . . is both flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law . . . and refuted by precedent.” Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671 (emphasis in original). Plainly, if we were “to presume a delegation of power” from the absence of “an express
withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy
virtually limitless hegemony . . . .” Id. (emphasis in
original). . . .
We further recognize that the existence of ambiguity
is not enough per se to warrant deference to the
agency’s interpretation. The ambiguity must be such
as to make it appear that Congress either explicitly or
implicitly delegated authority to cure that ambiguity.
Cir. 2005); cf. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (noting that “the [statutory] limitation to exporting or importing countries says nothing about the form of legal mandate”). But see Garcia-Carias v.
Holder, 697 F.3d 257, 268 (5th Cir. 2012) (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress’s failure to codify the departure rule for immigration cases shows that
Congress intended to delegate that decision to the agency).
220
Am. Bar Ass’n, 430 F.3d at 468.
221
Id. at 470 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(a)).
222
Id. at 465–66.
223
Id. at 468.
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“Mere ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.” Michigan v.
EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). The deference mandated in Chevron
“comes into play, of course, only as a consequence
of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing
court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the
agency.” Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp.,
137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added). . . .224
Following this rebuke, the court held that Congress did not,
through its silence, implicitly delegate power to the FTC to regulate
attorneys.225
The Fourth Circuit similarly held that silence alone is insufficient to constitute implicit delegation and trigger Chevron’s second
step.226 In Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, the court held that the
National Labor Relations Board did not have authority to enact a
notice-posting requirement.227 The NLRB argued that it had the
power to promulgate its notice-posting regulation simply because
Congress had not expressly withheld that authority.228 In response,
the court noted that there is no presumption that Congress delegated
a specific power to an agency based solely on the fact that the legislature did not expressly withhold such power.229 As the court explained, the analysis is “whether Congress intended to grant [an
agency] the authority to issue [a] challenged rule—and not whether
Congress intended to withhold that power.”230 Thus, the court held
that Congress must specifically grant authority for an agency to act,
not simply remain silent.231 In sum, American Bar Association,
224

Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 469.
226
Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 2013).
227
Id. at 154.
228
Id. at 159.
229
Id. at 160.
230
Id.
231
Id. (citing Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005));
accord Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Agency authority may not be lightly presumed. . . . ‘Thus, we will not presume a delegation of
power based solely on the fact that there is not an express withholding of such
225
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Chamber of Commerce, and other cases have held that congressional
silence alone is simply insufficient to show that Congress delegated
interpretive authority to an agency. Hence, any ensuing agency regulation is not entitled to deference.232
The
alternative
presumption—silence-equals-delegatedpower—would lead to virtually unconstrained agency lawmaking.
Such a presumption “would in effect be blank checks drawn to the
credit of some administrative officer or board.”233 For example,
§ 701 does not address the taxation of hedge funds or façade easements or flying to the moon.234 Under the silence-equals-delegatedpower presumption, the Treasury would have power to regulate all
three areas because Congress did not withhold such power.
The silence-equals-delegated-power presumption would require
Congress to specifically negate any power it did not intend to delegate. “Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually
limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron
and quite likely with the Constitution as well.”235 The question at
step one of Chevron is whether Congress has “directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,”236 not, as Professors Cunningham and
Repetti contend, whether “the statute addresses the subject matter of

power.’”) (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
232
See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853,
861 (7th Cir. 2002); Am. Petroleum Inst., 52 F.3d at 1120; Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir.), amended by 38 F.3d
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
233
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 275 (1946) (the legislative history to the APA).
234
See I.R.C. § 701.
235
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted); accord Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 502
(5th Cir. 2007); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d at 1082 (“Mere ambiguity in a statute
is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.”) (citations omitted);
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (The
deference mandated in Chevron “comes into play, of course, only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency.”); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at
671.
236
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (emphasis added).
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the regulation” at all.237 Whether Congress spoke directly to the precise question at issue is a more complex question than whether Congress was merely silent. Courts should not presume Congress delegated interpretive power to an agency simply because Congress did
not expressly withhold such power. Were courts to do so, the potential breadth of implied agency delegation would be simply stunning.
b. General Words Are Not Delegation
Not only is silence insufficient to constitute implied delegation,
but general words like “necessary” and “needful” are similarly insufficient.238 Hence, the Treasury cannot successfully argue that its
general grant of authority in § 7805(a) to prescribe all needful rules
as may be necessary provides implied delegated power.
Agencies are entitled to deference when they interpret identifiable ambiguous language in a statute.239 When applying Chevron, a
court asks “whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of
the statute.”240 For example, in Chevron, the issue for the Supreme
Court was whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the term “stationary source” in a provision of the Clean Air
Act was valid.241 The language the agency interpreted was identifiable: “stationary source.”242
This axiom is true in the tax world as well; to illustrate, in Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, the Court applied
Chevron to uphold the Treasury’s interpretation of the term “reserve
strengthening” in § 1023(e)(3)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.243
In both Chevron and Atlantic Mutual, and in thousands more, courts
237

Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 51.
See infra text accompanying notes 250–258.
239
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843
(2012) (“Chevron and later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that
Congress did not delegate gap-filling authority to an agency; and they find in ambiguous language at least a presumptive indication that Congress did delegate that
gap-filling authority.”).
240
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 51.
241
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
242
Id.
243
Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 391 (1998); accord Loving v.
IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1016–17 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Treasury’s interpretation of the phrase “representatives of persons before the Department of the
Treasury” as including tax-return preparers).
238
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have applied Chevron to evaluate an agency’s interpretation of identifiable, ambiguous language in a statute or act.244
As noted earlier,245 the Treasury claimed that two statutes provided the agency with interpretive authority: I.R.C. §§ 7805(a) and
701.246 However, the Treasury did not actually interpret specific language in either statute.
First, the Treasury did not interpret identifiable language in
§ 7805(a). Section 7805(a) provides in relevant part: “the Secretary
shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary
by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.”247
This statute is a general grant of authority to the Treasury to issue
rules and regulations as “needful” and “necessary” to enforce the tax
code.248 Section 7805(a) does not mention the words “partnerships,”
“the intent of subchapter K,” the judicially developed anti-abuse
doctrines, “purposivism,” “literalism,” or even “subchapter K.”
Thus, the regulation does not interpret any identifiable word or
words in § 7805(a).249
The Treasury might argue that it interpreted the words “needful”
and “necessary.”250 Making this argument, the Treasury might claim
that the regulation was necessary and needful because those forming
partnerships were running amok and abusing the tax rules. However,
general words like “needful” and “necessary” are insufficient alone

244

For example, in Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. at 1839, the majority
identified and italicized the relevant statutory language: “omits from gross income
an amount properly includible therein . . . .” See generally William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1094 (2008) (cataloguing all 1014 Supreme Court cases decided between Chevron
and Hamdan in which a federal agency interpreted a statute).
245
See supra Section V.B.
246
Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17,
1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
247
I.R.C. § 7805(a).
248
Id.
249
See id.
250
Professors Cunningham and Repetti did not make this argument in their
article. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 53–54 (failing to address
§ 7805(a)). However, Professor Cunningham has subsequently raised this argument with me. See Email from James Repetti (Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with author).

198

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:152

to provide the ambiguity needed to reach Chevron’s second step, as
the Fourth Circuit held in Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB.251
In Chamber of Commerce, the statute at issue provided the
NLRB with the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of [the National Labor Relations Act].”252 The
NLRB promulgated a regulation requiring “[a]ll employers . . . [to]
post notices to employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of
their NLRA rights, together with Board contact information and information concerning basic enforcement procedures.”253
The NLRB argued that the statute authorized the agency “to issue rules that [were] ‘necessary to carry out’ the provisions of the
Act.”254 The NLRB contended that the word “necessary” was inherently ambiguous and, thus, that the court must uphold the agency’s
reasonable interpretation of that term pursuant to Chevron’s second
step.255 In essence, the NLRB contended that because the word “necessary” was ambiguous, Congress implicitly delegated interpretive
power to it.
The court disagreed and explained that “‘[t]he ambiguity must
be such as to make it appear that Congress either explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to cure that ambiguity [to the
agency].’”256 Examining the rest of the relevant Act, the court concluded that Congress had not granted the NLRB the power to issue
the notice-posting rule.257 In other words, the court held that the ambiguity in a general word like “necessary” was insufficient to constitute implied delegation.258 This holding makes sense: consider
how expansively the Treasury might regulate if the terms “needful”
and “necessary” justified any action the agency wanted to take.

251

Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 161 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 155 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 156) (emphasis added).
253
Id. at 156 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 104.202(a)).
254
Id. at 160 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 156). This language is almost identical to
§ 7805(a), which gives the Treasury the power “to prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of [the tax laws] . . . .” I.R.C. § 7805(a).
255
Chamber of Commerce, 721 F.3d at 161.
256
Id. at 161 (quoting Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
257
Id. at 162.
258
Id. at 161.
252
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More recently, in King v. Burwell,259 the Supreme Court again
concluded that a general grant of authority was insufficient. The issue in the case involved a requirement in the Affordable Care Act260
that tax credits “be allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer,”261 but
only if the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through “an
Exchange established by the State.”262 Many states chose to let the
federal government establish their exchanges.263
The Act provided, “The Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section . . . .”264 The Treasury promulgated a regulation265 interpreting the language—”an Exchange established by the
State”—as allowing tax credits “regardless of whether the Exchange
[was] established and operated by a State . . . or by HHS.”266 Two
lower courts had split regarding whether the Treasury’s interpretation was entitled to deference, but both courts applied the Chevron
analysis.267
259
260

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.

119.
261

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)).
26 U. S. C. §§ 36B(b)–(c) (emphasis added).
263
At the time of the litigation, only sixteen States and the District of Columbia had established exchanges, while thirty-four States opted to have the federal
government do so. Brief of respondents Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, et al., No. 14–114, at 11 (filed Jan. 21, 2015).
264
I.R.C. § 36B(g). Some commentators have argued that this broad, general
grant of authority should be sufficient. Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan,
King v. Burwell: What Does it Portend for Chevron’s Domain?, 43 PEPP. L. REV.
75 (citing Syd Gernstein, King v. Burwell: A Win for the President, but a Loss for
the IRS?, FED. TAX BLOG (June 25, 2015), http://www.bna.com/king-burwellwin-b17179928783/; Andy Grewal, Brown & Williamson vs. Congressional Intent; YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 30, 2015),
http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/brown-williamson-vs-congressional-intent-byandy-grewal).
265
Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2 (2014). The Supreme Court mistakenly calls the regulation an “IRS rule.” Id. at 2487.
266
Id. at 2487 (citing 45 CFR §155.20).
267
The Fourth Circuit rejected their arguments. Applying Chevron deference,
the court first concluded that the statute was ambiguous, and then found Treasury’s interpretation to be reasonable under Chevron’s second step. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). In
contrast, the D.C. Circuit had concluded just the opposite in another case at nearly
the same time. The D.C. Circuit found the statute clear at Chevron’s first step and
262
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The Supreme Court, refused to apply Chevron at all, calling
King an “extraordinary case[].”268 The Court reasoned that the question of whether plaintiffs had to purchase health care was one of
such “deep ‘economic and political significance’ [and was so] central to this statutory scheme,” that if Congress wished to assign resolution of that question to an agency, “[Congress] surely would have
done so expressly.”269 Because the majority did not find a clear expression of congressional intent to delegate this issue to the Treasury
or IRS, the agencies had no such power.270 Instead, the Court interpreted the statutory language without regard to the agency’s regulation.271 Thus, general grants of authority are simply insufficient to
demonstrate congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority.
Here, not only did the Treasury not interpret specific language
in § 7805(a), the Treasury did not interpret specific language in
§ 701.272 Section 701 provides: “A partnership as such shall not be
subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying
on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their
separate or individual capacities.”273 Admittedly, this section contains a number of potentially ambiguous words and phrases that the
Treasury could have interpreted: for example, what is a “partnership,” and “when are persons carrying on business as partners”? Undoubtedly, Congress implicitly delegated power to the Treasury to
interpret these terms. Had the Treasury interpreted either of these
terms, then Chevron would be the appropriate standard to apply.

never reached step two. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g
en banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14–5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 4, 2014).
268
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488.
269
Id. at 2489 (emphasis added).
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Professors Cunningham and Repetti do not specifically explain how § 701
provides implicit authority to the Treasury. Rather, they seem to suggest that Subchapter K as a whole provides such authority. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra
note 24, at 53–54 (discussing the legislative history of subchapter K, and then
noting that “the statute [§ 701] does not address the subject matter of the regulations . . . .”). Subchapter K contains more statutes than just § 701; it is a collection
of seventy-two different sections.
273
I.R.C. § 701.
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The Treasury might argue that it interpreted one or more of these
terms by codifying the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.274
Making this argument, the Treasury might contend that those businesses that met the regulation’s three requirements would be valid
“partnerships” and their owners would be recognized as “persons
carrying on business as partners,” while those businesses that did
not meet the regulation’s requirements would be recast, or disregarded. Especially given that § 7805(a) allows the Treasury to prescribe all “needful” and “necessary” rules for tax purposes, this argument at first glance appears to have some force.
There are two problems with it, however. First, even if this argument were accurate, at best it supports the conclusion that the
Treasury had interpretive authority to codify and modify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines to define valid partnerships; it
provides no support for the conclusion that the Treasury had interpretive authority to issue the theoretical directives.
Second, the Treasury never claimed to be interpreting either
term in § 701. Rather, the Treasury claimed to be interpreting “the
intent of subchapter K.”275 Thus, the Treasury expects deference for
discerning statutory purpose, or legislative intent, for subchapter K.
To my knowledge, no court has ever applied Chevron to defer to an
agency’s characterization of congressional intent or statutory purpose, nor should one.276 An agency’s construction of ambiguous
statutory language receives deference because courts presume that
274

Professors Cunningham and Repetti note that “[t]he regulation provides a
working definition of ‘the intent of subchapter K.’ According to the regulation,
subchapter K is intended ‘to permit taxpayers to conduct joint business (including
investment) activities through a flexible economic arrangement without incurring
an entity-level tax.’” Cunningham and Repetti, supra note 24, at 37 (citing Treas.
Reg. § 1.701-2(a)).
275
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). Further, the NPRM was very clear that “[the antiabuse regulation] clarifies the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to recast those transactions that exploit and misuse the provisions of subchapter
K in an attempt to avoid tax.” Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581
(proposed May 17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
276
An email inquiry to the administrative law listserv proved unsuccessful at
identifying any cases in which a court had applied Chevron deference to an
agency’s determination of statutory purpose or legislative intent or in which an
agency had received Chevron deference even though it had not interpreted ambiguous statutory language. See Email from Linda D. Jellum (Apr. 24, 2014) (on
file with author along with responses).
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Congress would want the administering agency, rather than the
courts, to resolve any ambiguity.277 The agency should resolve these
ambiguities because deciding the meaning or the reach of a statute
involves reconciling conflicting policies.278 Agencies are experts in
their fields and are better than courts at reconciling policies.279 If an
agency’s choice represents a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policies, and if Congress committed resolution of that choice
to the agency, then courts should not disturb the agency’s resolution
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.280
In contrast, judges, who are experts in statutory interpretation, are
better suited to determine statutory purpose and legislative intent.281
With the possible exception of textualists, most judges would
agree that an agency should consider statutory purpose and legislative intent in construing the meaning of ambiguous statutory language.282 While an agency may use its understanding of legislative
intent and statutory purpose to interpret ambiguous statutory language, the agency’s discernment of that intent and purpose is not
entitled to Chevron deference. Indeed, an agency’s discernment of
purpose and intent is not entitled to deference of any kind. Thus, an
agency’s interpretation of ambiguous language is entitled to Chevron deference, but an agency’s determination of the statutory purpose or the legislative intent is not.
Moreover, the Treasury did not just discern statutory purpose or
legislative intent for one statute or a few related statutes; the Treasury attempted to discern that purpose or intent collectively for the
seventy-two separate statutes that comprise an entire subchapter of
277

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
278
Id. at 844–45.
279
See ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994).
280
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
281
See Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13
TOURO L. REV. 595, 597 (1997) (“Overwhelmingly what federal judges do is interpret federal statutes and federal regulations.”).
282
See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 442 n.4 (1990) (quoting Justice Scalia as saying, “I play
the game like everybody else . . . . I’m in a system which has accepted rules and
legislative history is used . . .”); John M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction: Differing Views on the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 203, 232 (2001).
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the Code. Congress enacted subchapter K as part of the 1954 overhaul of the Internal Revenue Code.283 The Internal Revenue Code of
1954 is 907 pages long; the new partnership laws were just one subpart of this massive act, which was amended in 1986.284 In 1994,
when the Treasury issued the anti-abuse regulation, the agency did
not interpret language in just one or even a few specific sections
within the Tax Reform Act of 1954; rather, the Treasury claimed to
discern that purpose for all seventy-two separate codified sections
of the partnership chapter.285 Subchapter K is a collection of statutes,
a regulatory regime, if you will. It is unclear whether an agency
should receive Chevron deference for articulating its understanding
of the purpose for an entire subchapter of the U.S. Code.
Even if the Treasury were entitled to Chevron deference for discerning congressional intent or statutory purpose collectively for an
entire subchapter of the U.S. Code, Chevron deference would still
be inappropriate, at least as applied to the Treasury’s decision to
adopt the purposivist directives. Chevron deference does not apply
to the Treasury’s decision to direct interpreters to adopt one statutory interpretation approach in favor of another. To my knowledge,
no court has ever applied Chevron deference to an agency’s issuance
of a theoretical directive.
In sum, application of Chevron’s second step in this case would
be unprecedented and unwarranted. Chevron applies when agencies
interpret identifiable, ambiguous language in a statute that has delegated interpretive power to the agency.286 In this case, the Treasury
interpreted legislative intent and statutory purpose for seventy-two
separate sections of the Code. Whether a court would reject Chevron
altogether and apply a de novo standard of review to the Treasury’s
action287 or would reject the agency’s regulation at Chevron’s first
step, the anti-abuse regulation is ultra vires, at best, and unconstitutional, at worst.

283

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954).
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
285
In 1994, subchapter K included seventy-two sections, specifically 26
U.S.C §§ 701–71. See Subchapter K Anti-Abuse Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 25581 (proposed May 17, 1994) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). It has since been amended
and now includes seventy-eight. See 26 U.S.C §§ 701–77 (2012).
286
See supra text accompanying notes 239–244.
287
Rather, the appropriate standard is de novo under the APA § 706(2)(B).
284
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C. Chevron’s Second Step
When Congress does not delegate power to an agency and the
agency acts anyway, the agency’s action is unconstitutional.288
However, when Congress delegates power to an agency but the
agency does not stay within the bounds of that delegated power, then
the agency’s action is not unconstitutional; it is ultra vires.289
In the last section of this Article, I demonstrate that Congress
did not delegate the power to issue the rules in the anti-abuse regulation. But, if I am wrong and a court were to conclude that Congress
delegated power to the Treasury, a question remains: is the regulation ultra vires?
When Congress delegates power, an agency must stay within the
bounds of its delegated power or the agency’s action is ultra vires.290
The agency stays within the bounds of its delegated power when the
statute clearly contemplates the regulation issued.291 To determine
whether the statute clearly contemplates the regulation issued,

288
See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). The
act is unconstitutional because the Federal Constitution vests in the executive the
executory powers, not legislative powers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. All legislative powers are vested in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Hence, agencies
cannot act absent delegation from Congress. Congress may delegate legislative
power to an agency pursuant to the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8. However, Congress must provide an agency with intelligible principles to
guide the exercise of any delegated power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457,
474–76 (2001).
289
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1994) (explaining the difference
between unconstitutional and ultra vires executive acts); Robinson v. Salazar, 885
F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2012); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863, 1869 (2013) (“Both [agencies’] power to act and how they are to act is
authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less
than when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”); Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that
FERC’s issuance of a regulation that regulated retail power was an “ultra vires
agency action.”); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir.
2008); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 876 (8th Cir. 2013); Loving
v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a Service rule regulating non-attorney, non-CPA tax-return preparers was ultra vires).
290
Robinson, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
291
Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 877 (citing O’Keefe v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir.1998)).
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courts generally turn to Chevron’s second step.292 At Chevron’s second step, a court must accept any “permissible,” or “reasonable,”
agency interpretation.293 In this case, the Treasury’s “interpretations” were not reasonable because: (1) the theoretical directives
conflict with Chevron, and (2) the judicially developed anti-abuse
doctrines were significantly altered.
1. THE THEORETICAL DIRECTIVES
The Treasury’s decision to adopt purposivism and reject literalism was unreasonable. As noted, the anti-abuse regulation specifically allows the Treasury to recast a transaction “even though the
transaction may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory
or regulatory provision . . . to achieve tax results that are consistent
with the intent of subchapter K.”294 It further allows, “[t]he Commissioner . . . [to] treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners
in whole or in part as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any
provision of the Internal Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder.”295 With these two provisions, the Treasury has
directed interpreters to ignore textualism, especially literalism,
whenever doing so is inconsistent with the Treasury’s understanding
of the intent of subchapter K or the purposes of any Code provision.
The directives are unreasonable because they conflict with Chevron.
Agencies have implied power to interpret statutory language
when Congress leaves ambiguity.296 When Congress is clear at
Chevron’s first step, agencies have no interpretive power: “Chevron
and later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that Congress did not delegate gap-filling authority to an agency . . . .”297 For
example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court held under Chevron’s first step that “Congress ha[d]
292
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
293
Id.; see Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014)
(“Even under Chevron’s deferential framework, agencies must operate ‘within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation.’”) (quoting City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at
1868).
294
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b).
295
Id. § 1.701-2(e).
296
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
297
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843
(2012).
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clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.”298 The Court reasoned, in part, that if Congress had
intended to “delegate a decision of such economic and political significance” to the agency, then Congress would have delegated far
more clearly.299 Thus, the Food and Drug Administration had no
power to interpret the statute.300
Where statutory text is unambiguous, an agency has no power to
construe it differently, even to further legislative intent or statutory
purpose.301 Agencies cannot rewrite unambiguous statutory language simply to meet bureaucratic policy goals, however laudable
those goals may be.302 An agency’s power to administer a federal
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to effectuate that statute is not the power to make law, for Congress can delegate no such
power.303 Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed in the statute.304 “Agencies
exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence
or ambiguity; they must always ‘give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.’”305

298

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000);
accord Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the
Treasury’s interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 330 “fails at Chevron step 1 because it is
foreclosed by the statute.”).
299
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160.
300
Id. at 160–61.
301
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S.
438, 462 (2002) (The agency lacked authority “to develop new guidelines or to
assign liability in a manner inconsistent with the statute. In the context of an unambiguous statute, [the Court] need not contemplate deferring to the agency’s
interpretation.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
228–29 (1994) (holding that the FCC’s interpretation of the word “modify” conflicted with its ordinary meaning); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d
216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The question is ‘whether the statutory text forecloses
the agency’s assertion of authority.’”) (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S.
Ct. 1863, 1871 (2013)); Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th
Cir. 2012); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Talley v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977).
302
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014).
303
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
304
See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936).
305
Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2445 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007)).
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Despite this truism, the Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation empowers the Commissioner to reject transactions that comply literally
with unambiguous statutory text when the Commissioner determines that the transactions violate the “intent of subchapter K.” If
the Commissioner made such a finding in a particular case and that
case were appealed, it is very possible that the reviewing court, particularly a court with a more text-focused judge, would reject the
Commissioner’s decision as unreasonable. Hence, the anti-abuse
regulation, which empowers the Commissioner to ignore clear text,
is unreasonable.
2. THE ANTI-ABUSE DOCTRINES
Similarly, the Treasury’s adoption and modification of the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines is unreasonable because the
Treasury significantly altered and expanded—rather than echoed
and codified—existing statutory and common law.306
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the sole authority to
make law.307 When Congress makes law, it broadly chooses policy
and then selects the method for achieving that policy. In doing so,
Congress may leave gaps for agencies to fill.308 While the line between gap-filling (law-executing) and law-making (legislating) is
admittedly a fine one, regulations that alter existing statutory and
common law doctrines cross that line.309 With the anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury significantly changed existing law by creating
tougher versions of the business-purpose doctrine and the economicsubstance principle and by combining both into one supersized
test.310
306

Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 610–16; see Nelson, supra note 92, at 642.
307
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
308
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
309
See, e.g., Stephenson Trust v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 283, 287 (1983) (taxpayers
challenged the validity of a Subchapter J regulation—the trusts and estates subchapter); cf. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004)
(“[W]here a taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress . . . the use of the ‘economic substance’ doctrine to trump ‘mere compliance
with the Code’ would violate the separation of powers.”), vacated, 454 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2006), quoted in Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 15, at 1947.
310
See Banoff, supra note 61, at 1864 (noting that “[t]he antiabuse rule appears to extend existing law and go beyond congressional principles.”).
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When the Treasury promulgated the anti-abuse regulation in
1994, the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines existed, although
their boundaries were ill-defined.311 Generally, these doctrines required tax transactions to satisfy both a tax statute’s language as well
as its underlying purpose.312 Satisfying the literal words of a tax law
became insufficient.
Collectively, these doctrines permit the Service to reject a taxpayer’s characterization of a business transaction that meets the literal terms of a tax statute when the taxpayer simultaneously seeks
tax benefits Congress did not intend.313 These doctrines include the
business-purpose doctrine and the substance-over-form principle.314
Substance-over-form serves as a background principle, supporting a
group of related doctrines including the following:315 the step-transaction doctrine, the “sham entity” doctrine, and the economic-substance doctrine.316 While it is not my point in this Article to detail

311
See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 610 (calling
the legal landscape in this area “opaque” and their parameters “unclear”).
312
See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 20. See generally Cohen,
supra note 17 (describing and criticizing the legislative development of tax avoidance tests).
313
See Galle, supra note 19, at 362; Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at
25–26; Caudill, ABA Comment, supra note 94 (“Transparent devices totally devoid of any non-tax significance to the parties cannot pass muster even though a
literal reading of the statutory language might suggest otherwise.”).
314
For a thorough overview of these doctrines as they were in 1978, see
Bittker, supra note 35, 703–23.
315
True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1176 n.11 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining “both the step transaction and sham transaction doctrines are corollaries of the
basic substance over form principle”); Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of the
Judicial Step Transaction Principle and a Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON
TAX J. 45, 47–48 (2007) (“Generally, the doctrines that have emerged can be divided into two subtests under the substance-over-form doctrine: (i) the economic
substance/sham transaction doctrines (with the business purpose doctrine included as the subjective prong), and (ii) the step transaction doctrine.”).
316
See generally Madison, supra note 20, at 718 (discussing the beginnings
of these common law doctrines); Blank & Staudt, supra note 25, at 1650–51 (describing these doctrines in slightly different terms). The economic substance doctrine was alternatively, and confusingly, called the sham-transaction doctrine for
a while. See Madison, supra note 20, at 718 (noting the overlap: “the jurisprudence of sham entities overlaps with factual substance-over-form principles. In
addition, the sham transaction doctrine is often called the economic substance
doctrine, and transactions discussed in the context of either the sham transaction
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the creation of these doctrines,317 a brief recap of the law as it existed
in 1994 is essential to understand how the Treasury significantly altered that law and why its interpretation is, thus, unreasonable.
The doctrines had their beginnings in 1935, with the seminal
case of Gregory v. Helvering.318 In that case, a taxpayer had complied literally with the statutory requirements for reorganization;319
however, the Service refused to recognize the transaction because
the taxpayer’s only motive in reorganizing was to avoid paying
taxes.320 In siding with the Service, the Supreme Court developed
the business-purpose doctrine.321 Pursuant to this doctrine, a transaction must serve a bona fide business purpose other than tax avoidance to qualify for beneficial tax treatment.322
In Gregory, the Court also laid the groundwork for the substance-over-form principle, or doctrine.323 When denying the tax

doctrine or the economic substance doctrine are often called economic or substantive shams . . . .”).
317
For an article that does so, see Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 589–604.
318
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
319
The relevant statute was § 112 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852,
Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 791 (1928).
320
Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (citation omitted).
321
Id. (criticizing the transaction as being nothing more than an “operation
having no business or corporate purpose—a mere device which put on the form
of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and
the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business”).
322
See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 21.
323
The jurisprudence and scholarship use both terms. Compare Falconwood
Corp. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (referring to the
“substance-over-form principle”), and True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1176
n.11 (10th Cir. 1999) (same), and Estate of Weinert v. Comm’r, 294 F.2d 750,
755 (5th Cir. 1961) (referring to the “substance-over-form” principle), and Emily
Cauble, Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions: Does a Taxpayer Ever Deserve
a Second Chance?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1013, 1030 (2012) (using the term “substance-over-form principles”), and Erick M. Jensen, Legislative and Regulatory
Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives, 57 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14 (2012) (same), with Rogers v. United States, 281 F.3d 1108,
1115 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing the “substance-over-form doctrine”), and Madison, supra note 20, and Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of
Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 677 (1995) (referring to the “substance over
form doctrine”). But see Charlene D. Luke, The Relevance Games: Congress’s
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benefits the taxpayer sought, the Court criticized the transaction as
“a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization
as a disguise for concealing its real character . . . .”324 Pursuant to
the substance-over-form principle, the government can tax the substance of a transaction rather than the formal steps a taxpayer uses
to complete it.325
From the substance-over-form principle, at least two different,
but related, doctrines emerged: the step-transaction doctrine326 and
economic-substance doctrine.327 Both doctrines reflect the idea that
if two transactions have the identical economic outcome, they
should have the same tax outcome.328
Economic substance, the more important doctrine for our purposes, actually began life as a principle329 and morphed into a doctrine through judicial development.330 Pursuant to the economicChoices for Economic Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW. 551, 567 n.85, 581
n.142 (2013) (using both terms).
324
Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469. Congress added a “no device” requirement to
the Code in 1954. I.R.C. § 368; see generally Stephen Rigsby, The Business Purpose Doctrine in Corporate Divisions, 11 AKRON L. REV. 275, 280–84 (1977)
(discussing the distinction between the business purpose doctrine and the “no device” language).
325
See Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 391; Cunningham
& Repetti, supra note 24, at 23.
326
The “step transaction” doctrine permits the Service to disregard steps in a
transaction when those steps lack independent significance. Cunningham &
Repetti, supra note 24, at 23.
327
See Madison, supra note 20, at 718 n.135 (citing Karen Nelson Moore, The
Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 660–62 (1989)).
328
Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 435; see Cunningham
& Repetti, supra note 24, at 23.
329
The Supreme Court developed the economic substance principle in
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). In that case, the Court denied tax
benefits to a taxpayer who paid $91,570 simply to reduce its tax obligation by
$233,297.68, potentially netting a profit of $141,727.68. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at
365–66. The Court noted that the transaction did “‘not appreciably affect [the taxpayer’s] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax . . . .’ For it is patent that there
was nothing of substance to be realized by [the taxpayer] from this transaction
beyond a tax deduction.” Id. at 366 (quoting Gilbert v. Comm’r, 248 F.2d 399,
411 (2d Cir. 1967) (Hand, J., dissenting)).
330
The economic-substance doctrine at one point was also called the shamtransaction doctrine. “‘Sham transaction’ terminology is confusing, however, because it encompasses ‘shams in fact,’ which are transactions that never occurred,
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substance principle, a court examines whether the transaction had a
prospect of profit before taxes.331 In other words, a transaction must
have a meaningful economic purpose or investor risk to be legitimate.332 And the Service can invalidate a transaction if it lacks economic substance independent of tax considerations.333
In Frank Lyon v. United States,334 the Supreme Court combined
the business-purpose doctrine and the economic-substance principle
into a single two-pronged test—the economic-substance doctrine.335
Under the business-purpose prong, a court assesses the taxpayer’s
underlying motivation for entering into the transaction.336 Under the
economic-substance prong, a court examines the transaction to determine whether the purported economic activity would have occurred absent the tax benefits.337 Thus, the business-purpose prong
focuses on the taxpayer’s intent, while the economic-substance
prong focuses on the transaction’s effect.338
When it combined the business-purpose doctrine and the economic-substance principle, the Court stated:
as well as ‘shams in substance,’ which lack economic substance. The substantive
sham cases typically apply the same or similar analysis as that used in economic
substance cases.” Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 391 n.1 (citing Yoram Keinan, The COLI Cases Through the Looking Glass of the Sham
Transaction Doctrine, 111 TAX NOTES 327, 330–31 (2006), and citing United
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2001)).
331
See Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 391 (arguing that
the modern economic-substance doctrine should be replaced with an examination
of congressional intent); Bankman, supra note 52, at 10 (citing Saba P’ship v.
Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684, 720–21 (1999)).
332
See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 364 (discussing the doctrine); Keeler v. Comm’r,
243 F.3d 1212, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Salina P’ship LP v. Comm’r, 80
T.C.M. (CCH) 686, 695 (2000) (holding that the transaction in question had “a
valid business purpose independent of tax benefits”); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.
738, 767 (1990).
333
See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
“‘the transaction [must have] practical economic effects other than the creation of
income tax losses’” (quoting Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir.
1990)).
334
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
335
Madison, supra note 20, at 727 (citing Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 583–
84).
336
Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 33, at 417.
337
Id.
338
Madison, supra note 20, at 725.
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[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations,
and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features
that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties
effectuated by the parties.339
Because this language was unclear regarding the relationship of
the two prongs, lower courts developed two versions of the economic-substance doctrine: one conjunctive and one disjunctive.340
Courts that used the conjunctive test allowed tax benefits only when
a transaction had both business purpose and economic substance.341
Courts that used the disjunctive test allowed tax benefits when a
transaction had either business purpose or economic substance.342

339

Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 583–84 (emphasis added).
A few courts apply a factors test. See, e.g., Casebeer v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d
1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “the Court’s holding in Frank Lyon
was not intended to outline a rigid two-step analysis . . . [rather] ‘the consideration
of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to
consider in the application of this court’s traditional sham analysis’”) (quoting
Sochin v. Comm’r, 843 F.2d 351, 354 (9th Cir. 1988)).
341
See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir.
2006) (“If the transaction has economic substance, ‘the question becomes whether
the taxpayer was motivated by profit’ . . . [but] ‘[i]f, however, the court determines
that the transaction is a sham, . . . the [subjective] inquiry is never made.’”) (quoting Illes v. Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992)); Coltec Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven if the transaction
has economic substance, a lack of economic substance is sufficient to disqualify
the transaction without proof that the taxpayer’s sole motive is tax avoidance.”);
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“[I]f a transaction lacks economic substance compelled by business or regulatory
realities, the transaction must be disregarded even if the taxpayers profess a genuine business purpose without tax-avoidance motivations.”); Horn v. Comm’r,
968 F.2d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that the transaction is a sham if
it lacks both economic substance and business purpose).
342
See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018
(11th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that the transaction is a sham if it lacks either economic substance or business purpose); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752
F.2d 89, 95 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the transaction is a sham if it lacks
both economic substance and business purpose); Black & Decker Corp. v. United
340

2015]

DODGING THE TAXMAN

213

When it fashioned the anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury
adopted these judicial anti-abuse doctrines; however, as I explained
in an earlier article and will re-cap here, when the Treasury adopted
these doctrines, it modified them and combined them in new
ways.343 First, the Treasury strengthened the business-purpose requirement. The judicially developed business-purpose doctrine required only that a taxpayer have some business purpose344 and allowed recasting only when bad motive was the principal purpose of
the transaction.345
In contrast, the Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation provides that
“[t]he partnership must be bona fide and each partnership transaction or series of related transactions . . . must be entered into for a
substantial business purpose.”346 In addition to requiring that the
partnership be bona fide, the anti-abuse regulation permits the Commissioner to recast a partnership if it was “formed or availed of in
States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) (saying when the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes and the transaction had no economic substance it
is a sham) (citing Rice’s Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91).
343
Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 610–16.
344
Nelson, supra note 92, at 645. For example, in Cottage Savings Ass’n v.
Commissioner, the taxpayer swapped the participation interests of one mortgage
portfolio for another, solely to realize a tax loss. 890 F.2d 848, 849 (6th Cir. 1989),
rev’d, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). The Sixth Circuit denied the tax benefits, noting:
“What is done for the purpose of tax avoidance must, however, have some business purpose and not be an economic transaction in form only. The courts will not
‘exalt artifice above reality.’” Id. at 853 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme
Court reversed. Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 568 (1991). In upholding the transaction, the Court ignored the taxpayer’s tax avoidance motive
and required very little in the way of a business purpose. Id. Similarly, in Rice’s
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit stated: “To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find the taxpayer was motivated by no business
purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction . . . .” Rice’s
Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91 (describing the business-purpose prong of the economic-substance doctrine).
345
Thompson Jr., supra note 103, at 1396 (acknowledging the change, but
suggesting that the choice seemed sensible); Cuff, supra note 96 (“The proposed
regulation changes current law by establishing a general requirement that taxpayers not engage in partnership transactions with ‘a principal purpose’ of avoiding
tax . . . [when] taxpayers have been generally free to engage in transactions with
a principal purpose of avoiding tax . . . .”); Comfort, supra note 92 (noting that
this provision “go[es] far beyond even the most extreme formulations of the business purpose doctrine under existing law”).
346
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which [was] to
reduce substantially” the partners’ tax liability.347 The regulation allows the Commissioner to recast a transaction when a principal purpose was tax avoidance rather than, as the judicially developed business-purpose doctrine allowed, when the principal purpose of the
transaction was tax avoidance.348 Further, the regulation allows the
Commissioner to recast a transaction when the taxpayer does not
have a substantial business purpose for the transaction rather than,
as the judicially developed business-purpose doctrine allowed, some
business purpose.349 With these changes, the Treasury increased the
standard for taxpayers to meet and thereby strengthened its ability
to challenge a taxpayer’s motivation.350
Strengthening business purpose was not the only change the
Treasury made in its regulation. Prior to the regulation’s promulgation, no court had included all of the judicially created anti-abuse
doctrines and principles in one conjunctive test.351 The closest such
test—the economic-substance doctrine—included just two antiabuse doctrines, business purpose and economic substance, joined
conjunctively or disjunctively.352 In contrast, the Treasury specifically incorporated all of the judicially developed substance-overform principles into one single, conjunctive test.353 And it combined
all of these principles without identifying specifically which principles it was including. The regulation provides simply that “[t]he
form of each partnership transaction must be respected under substance over form principles.”354 Which substance-over-form principles should be respected is not clear. For example, although the antiabuse regulation does not separately refer to the step-transaction
doctrine or the economic-substance doctrine, presumably, the Treasury intended to include both of these doctrines. Thus, the Treasury
combined all of the substance-over-form principles and, thus, supersized the judicially created anti-abuse doctrines.
347

Id. § 1.701-2(b) (emphasis added).
Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 612.
349
Id.
350
Sowell, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 81–88 (describing
transactions to which the Treasury claimed the anti-abuse regulation applied).
351
See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 611.
352
Id. at 622.
353
Id.
354
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a)(2).
348
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Strengthening business purpose and joining all of the judicially
created anti-abuse doctrines were not the only changes the Treasury
made when it promulgated the anti-abuse regulation. The Treasury
also included an optional “proper reflection of income” prong.355
Pursuant to this prong, “the tax consequences under subchapter K to
each partner of partnership operations and of transactions between
the partner and the partnership must accurately reflect the partners’
economic agreement and clearly reflect the partner’s income . . . .”356
This “clear reflection of income” prong was never part of the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines.357 Although there was some
support for this requirement within other statutes in subchapter K,
the existing statutes were not quite this broadly applicable.358 While
some have suggested that the clear reflection and allocation of income factors made this prong of the anti-abuse regulation superfluous, the prong actually expanded existing law.359
Consequently, with the anti-abuse regulation, the Treasury altered existing law, both statutory and “common law,”360 in a number
of ways. First, the Treasury strengthened the common law’s requirement of business purpose by allowing the Commissioner to recast a
transaction when a principal purpose was tax avoidance and the taxpayer did not otherwise have a substantial business purpose for the
transaction.361 Second, the Treasury crafted a super-sized anti-abuse

355

See id. § 1.701-2(a)(3).
Id.
357
See Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 611.
358
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 446 (“If no method of accounting has been regularly used
by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of
the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.”); id. § 482 (allowing the Secretary to
allocate income among businesses to “clearly . . . reflect the income of any
such . . . businesses”).
359
See Marino, supra note 18, at 174; Nelson, supra note 92, at 646–47.
360
Technically, “‘[c]ommon law’ refers to that body of governing principles,
mainly substantive, expounded by the common-law courts of England in deciding
cases before them.” William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common Law in
the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 393 (1968). In this Article,
I use the term more colloquially to mean simply judge-made legal doctrine.
361
See supra text accompanying notes 344–350.
356
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test, which, while incorporating the common-law anti-abuse doctrines, also combined them in new ways.362 The super-sized test includes a tougher business-purpose element and all of the substanceover-form principles in one conjunctive test.363 Moreover, the supersized test includes an optional third prong—the proper-reflectionof-income prong—which did not exist in this form in the common
law or the Code.364 In sum, the anti-abuse regulation significantly
increased the standard taxpayers had to meet to receive tax benefits
under subchapter K.
While Professors Cunningham and Repetti suggest that “[t]he
implied delegation from Congress necessarily included the ability to
modify and adapt judicial doctrines existing in 1954 to changed circumstances,”365 I disagree. The Treasury’s interpretation is unreasonable because it transforms and enormously expands the Treasury’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
When an agency discovers in a “long-extant statute an unheralded
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’
[the Supreme Court] typically greet[s] its announcement with a
measure of skepticism. [The Court] expect[s] Congress to speak
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”366 Here, the Treasury assumed
the power to significantly alter the judicially developed anti-abuse
doctrines (thereby assuming the power to recast potentially thousands of partnership transactions) and to select a method of statutory
interpretation. Yet Congress did not clearly authorize either power.
Administrative agencies have no power to make law, for Congress can delegate no such power.367 Rather, agencies administer
federal statutes by promulgating rules and regulations to effect the
will of Congress as expressed by the governing, or enabling, statute.368 “A regulation which does not do this, but operates to create a
362

See supra text accompanying notes 351–355.
Id.
364
Jellum, Judicial Anti-Abuse Doctrines, supra note 19, at 614.
365
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 54.
366
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)).
367
See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
368
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (“‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making
363
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rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.”369 “Although
regulations are entitled to considerable weight, ‘[the Treasury] may
not usurp the authority of Congress by adding restrictions to a statute
which are not there.’”370 Indeed, “the question a court faces when
confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers
is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds
of its statutory authority.”371
A regulation is unreasonable when it extends beyond the scope
of Congress’s implied delegation of authority.372 The anti-abuse regulation is unreasonable because it extends beyond any express or
implied congressional delegation. To be precise, the Treasury created new law by combining and altering existing common and statutory law.373 The Treasury has no authority to make new law;374
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
369
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. at 134.
370
Stephenson Trust v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 283, 288 (1983) (quoting Estate of
Boeshore v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 523, 527 (1982)); see Am. Auto. Ass’n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687, 697 (1961) (“[C]ourts should be wary of broad-scale incorporation of the doctrine of ‘tax avoidance,’ or ‘business purpose,’ or ‘sham’ in an
area so fraught with its own particular problems and nuances. At the very least,
we are required to limit those judicially developed doctrines to the situations
which they were intended to cover.”), quoted in Stephenson Trust, 81 T.C. at 291.
371
Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)); See id. at 1022 (holding that the
Treasury had no authority to regulate tax-return preparers, especially given that it
denied having such power for many years).
372
Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 24, at 49 (citing Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484–86 (2001), and citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387–92 (1999)).
373
Accord Comm’r v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 92 (1959) (invalidating a Treasury
regulation because it conflicted with the statute); Coady v. Comm’r, 33 T.C. 771,
779 (1960) (rejecting the Commissioner’s interpretation of a statute that was
based on a committee report when it differed from the text of the statute), aff’d,
289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446–47
(1936) (invalidating a Treasury regulation that conflicted with the statute); Lynch
v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315, 320–22 (1924) (holding that the statutory
definition of adulterated butter could not be limited to a percentage of moisture in
the butter but required an element of intent to adulterate); Miller v. United States,
294 U.S. 435, 439–40 (1935).
374
See Jensen, supra note 323, at 43 (stating that the Treasury “probably does
not have authority to issue a general anti-avoidance rule that would apply across
the board,” but suggesting that the Treasury might have had or claimed to have
had authority to do so in the area of partnership taxation).
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hence, the anti-abuse regulation is unreasonable and, therefore, ultra
vires.
CONCLUSION
Abusive tax shelters are certainly a problem, and one that is not
going away. The government has strong reasons for wanting to combat the abuse with any legitimate means it can find. The Treasury’s
frustration with the abuse of the partnership tax laws, in particular,
stems from the broad latitude businesses have to structure partnership agreements. Partnerships and other pass-through entities remain a commonly used entity form; however, the partnership laws
provide a number of opportunities for tax abuse. The anti-abuse regulation empowers the Service to look at the results of each transaction to see whether abusive behavior has occurred (such as income
shifting and abusive deductions). The Treasury’s goal to stop abuse
was indeed laudable.
While the goal behind the regulation cannot be faulted, the antiabuse regulation is simply not a legitimate choice to implement that
goal. The Treasury assumed power that was never delegated to it;
hence, the regulation is unconstitutional or, alternatively, ultra vires.
As for the theoretical directives, Congress had authority to delegate the power to promulgate such directives to the Treasury. Some
have argued that because Congress could legitimately select an approach to judicial interpretation, Congress, by never making such a
choice, implicitly delegated this choice to the Treasury. This argument is flawed. Congress has no such power, and Congress cannot
delegate power it does not have. Additionally, Congress cannot delegate power through silence or general words. As for codifying the
judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines, Congress neither implicitly nor explicitly delegated this authority to the Treasury.
In addition, even if one could find an implicit delegation of either power to the Treasury, the agency’s action was ultra vires because the regulation exceeds the limits of any delegated power. Generally, courts turn to Chevron deference to determine whether agencies stay within the bounds of implicitly delegated power. Yet, deference is simply inappropriate here. Under Chevron, deference is
appropriate when an agency interprets ambiguous language in a statute or, perhaps, a few statutes. While agencies have the authority to
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interpret ambiguous statutory language and fill gaps, courts should
not defer to an agency’s understanding of the statutory purpose for
seventy-two different statutes in the Code or for the intent of the
legislative body enacting those seventy-two different sections. The
Treasury did not interpret ambiguous language in a statute. Rather,
the Treasury discerned purpose and intent for an entire subchapter
of the Code, containing seventy-two different statutes. Deference is
inappropriate.
Moreover, even assuming deference is appropriate, the Treasury’s anti-abuse regulation fails Chevron’s second step for two reasons. First, the Treasury included two theoretical directives, which
directly conflict with Chevron. Second, the Treasury’s attempt to
codify the judicially developed anti-abuse doctrines was unreasonable because the Treasury significantly expanded existing common
and statutory law. While agencies have the power to fill gaps and
interpret ambiguous statutory language, they have no power to expand existing common or statutory law without clearly delegated
authority. In sum, “we are probably better off with an IRS forced to
follow statutory law and to look to Congress to clean up the statutes
and to the courts for equity.”375
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